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Throughout the post-World War II period, judges invoked
the specter of totalitarianism as part of the struggle to define
the scope of constitutional limits on government authority.
In this Article, Professor Margaret Raymond examines the
courts' use of these totalitarian comparisons and explores the
role that the comparisons played in the development of
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine. She argues that,
in using the comparisons to provide contemporary context
for their decisions, the courts demonstrated the principle of
constitutional interpretation as translation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The worst thing you can say about American law enforcement
officers may be that they act like fascists. The National Rifle
Association's reference to agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms ("BATF") as "'jackbooted government thugs'" who
wear " 'Nazi bucket helmets and storm trooper uniforms' " and
"'harass, intimidate, even murder law-abiding citizens,'" caused an
uproar.' The invocation of Nazism in this context is hardly unique.
1. Sam Howe Verhovek, An Angry Bush Ends His Ties to Rifle Group, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 1995, at Al (quoting Letter from former President George Bush to National
Rifle Association (May 3, 1995)). The phrases were used in a National Rifle Association
fundraising letter as early as 1981. See id. Their use prompted former President George
Bush to resign from the organization, saying, "'Your broadside against federal agents
deeply offends my own sense of decency and honor, and it offends my concept of service
to country.'" Id. (quoting Letter from former President George Bush to National Rifle
Association (May 3, 1995)). Referring to a particular BATF agent killed in the gunfight
at the Branch Davidian compound, he went on, "'I can assure you that this honorable
man, killed by weird cultists, was no Nazi.'" Id.; see also 141 CONG. REC. H1380 at
H1382 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("The consequences of the
behavior of the BATF... is [sic] that they are not trusted. They are detested, and I have
described them properly as jackbooted American fascists."). But see id. at H1383
(statement of Rep. Lightfoot) ("Not being the boot-jacked [sic] Gestapo, as they were
described earlier, they are good, hard-working Federal employees .... ).
The totalitarian metaphor has come to dominate high-stakes criminal defense. Note
the use of a comparison to Hitler by attorney Johnnie Cochran during his representation
of defendant O.J. Simpson:
Mr. Fuhrman had once said that he would like to place black people in a pile and
burn them. "There was another man not too long ago in the world who wanted
to bum people," Mr. Cochran said. "People didn't care. People said he's just
crazy, he's just a half-baked painter. This man, this scourge became one of the
worst people in this world, Adolf Hitler, because people didn't care, didn't try to
stop him."
David Margolick, With Tale of Racism and Error, Simpson Lawyers Seek Acquittal, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995, at Al.
Defense counsel are not the only ones using these arguments in high-profile trials. In
closing argument at the trial of Oliver North, the prosecution argued, "'North and
McFarlane are following Adolf Hitler's old strategy. He was the one who said, the victor
will never be asked if he told the truth.'" United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 895 (D.C.
Cir.), withdrawn and superseded in part by 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The defense
response was heated:
"[B]eyond anything I have heard in a courtroom, and outrageous to the extent
that it should send a course of rage through everybody in this room, is the
reference to Adolf Hitler. This marine, retired, was linked in this courtroom to
Adolf Hitler. Some in this room have fought Adolf Hitler. They know what
Adolf Hitler was. And this man is not Adolf Hitler and he doesn't do things like
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From a time when calling someone a fascist constituted "fighting
words"2 through the "fascist" label of the 1960s, the term "Nazi" is
now often used to signify a perceived rigidity in contexts from the
blatantly political3 to the intensely ideologica 4 to the ridiculously
insignificant.5 Along with claims that comparisons to Nazism are
impermissible low blows in the particular instance come protests that
the use of the terms is inappropriate because it devalues them,6
trivializing the suffering of Holocaust victims and the demonic nature
of Nazism.7 The battle lines are drawn: Can the Nazi metaphor fairly
Adolf Hitler, and to suggest it indicates the extraordinary drive, the force, the
power of this government to put its might on top of Colonel North, to see what
they can say is a crime. You should be offended by it. And you should judge
everything they say, because anyone that will link Colonel North to Adolf Hitler
is not credible and should not be believed."
Id. at 895 n.32 (quoting defense counsel). The court concluded that, while the
prosecutor's statement had been "[u]nquestionably inflammatory" and "reflected
remarkably poor judgment," the defense's forceful reply prevented any substantial
prejudice to North. Id at 895.
2. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942). The Court held that
Chaplinsky, in calling the City Marshal of Rochester, New Hampshire, a "damned
Fascist," had used "fighting words" so "likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace," id. at 574, that their use could be
criminalized without violating the First Amendment, see id. at 573.
3. The term "feminazi" is sometimes used by conservative commentators, to some
objection. One journalist criticized use of the term, arguing that "[a]ny time any woman
behaved or spoke in a manner deemed too liberal or too controversial or just too
annoying, she was labelled a 'feminazi,' " and that it "sicken[s] [me] when I hear the word
'feminazi.' I'm not angry for myself as a woman because I can-and do-fight back. But
I'm angry for the millions who can't fight back because they were killed by the real
Nazis." Manya Warn, A Shout Across Gender Gap, BUFF. NEWS, Sept. 22, 1996, at B2.
4. See, e.g., Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992). Zal, an attorney,
represented seven abortion protesters who were charged with criminal trespass at a clinic.
See id. at 925. He was ordered by the court not to use any one of 50 specific words listed
by the court, including, among others, the words "holocaust," "Nazi," "genocide,"
"Hitler," "extermination," and "mass destruction." Id.
5. Consider, for example, the "Soup Nazi" of television's Seinfeld, a character so
named because of his inflexible insistence that customers follow a prescribed code of
behavior in ordering soup. See Al Brumley, One Wrong Move with Soup Nazi and You're
in Soup, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Jan. 7, 1996, at F5. Less well known, perhaps, is the
"Sandwich Nazi of Buffalo," the proprietor of a sandwich shop bearing a sign setting out
the requirements for service: " 'Your [sic] only allowed three questions. You should
know what you want before you enter. You have one minute to give your order.'"
Janice Okun, Attitude to Go: He's Cranky, He's Opinionated, and He Makes a Great
Sandwich, BUFF. NE vS, Sept. 10, 1997, at C1.
6. Whether they are devalued because of their trivialization and overuse or whether
they are capable of being trivialized and overused because they have been devalued is a
chicken-or-the-egg sort of question. Yet temporal distance from the reality of Nazism
and the consequent inability to understand viscerally its horrors argue forcefully for the
latter.
7. See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Hitlers Great and Small, BALTIMORE SUN, June 6,
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be used to characterize government misconduct?
What is interesting about this question is that for a long time no
one asked it. Yet the idea that what we think about Nazism, or about
other examples of regimes in which unrestrained police power is
systematically abused, is, or should be, relevant to the legal limits on
the scope of police authority is hardly new. Arguments that
particular types of police conduct, if not checked by constitutional
restriction, could open the door to the worst excesses of
totalitarianism were at one time used extensively in addressing issues
of constitutional criminal procedure.'
Throughout the postwar period, judges invoked the specter of
totalitarianism as part of the struggle to define the scope of
constitutional limits on police authority. They argued-sometimes
successfully, sometimes not-that the American constitutional
system could not be permitted to open the door to totalitarian
abuses. Moreover, they argued implicitly that the potential for
totalitarian excess itself ought to play a role in determining
constitutional limits on police activity. These arguments, and the role
they played in making the law of criminal procedure central to
America's self-concept, helped to set the stage for the Warren Court
"revolution."
Of course judges during the postwar period would feel they
understood the imminent threat to the liberties of individuals, and of
society as a whole, posed by centralized police authority operating
without meaningful external controls. It stands to reason they would
have those examples in mind as they considered challenges to police
practices in their own society. The broader question is what role
these examples played in the development of constitutional criminal
procedure doctrine.
1995, at All; Michael Janofsky, U.S. Candidates Fling Increasingly Stronger Insults;
Comparisons to Hitler Are No Longer Rare in Political Demonizing, DALLAS MORNING
NEws, Oct. 29, 1995, at A8; Barbara Yost, O.J. Lawyer Should Apologize for Hitler
Hyperbole, PHOENIX GAZETrE, Oct. 19, 1995, at B6. A cartoon expresses this best. A
narrator tells us: "'Feminazis would like women to have the same opportunities in life as
men. "Smoking Nazis" would rather breathe clean air than secondhand cigarette smoke.
The actual Nazis systematically slaughtered six million men, women and children. I really
hate Nazi analogies.'" His companion replies: "'What are you-some kind of language
Nazi?'" Tom Tomorrow, This Modem World, in ICON, Oct. 2-8, 1997, at 3.
8. Negative comparisons with totalitarian regimes permeate postwar judicial
writings in many areas. I do not purport to catalog the phenomenon systematically, only
to point out its prevalence and significance in the criminal procedure area. For an
ambitious attempt to explain modem constitutional law and theory as the product of anti-
totalitarianism, see generally Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence:
Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423 (1996).
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This Article argues that American constitutional criminal
procedure norms during the postwar period were defined in part in
reaction to those negative totalitarian models. The use of these
models cast into sharp relief the centrality of constitutional criminal
procedure to the values inherent in the American system, and
reflected a shared understanding about the relationship between a
society's criminal procedure norms and the character of its
government. If invasive police procedures were critical to the
establishment and maintenance of a totalitarian government,
appropriate limits on police authority must, in contrast, be critical to
the underlying tenets of American society. Debates about criminal
procedure norms thus reflected deeper and more fundamental
questions about the nature of the American social and political
community. Arguments about coerced confessions, electronic
eavesdropping, or bus sweeps became larger questions about the way
judges, lawyers, and legal scholars imagined the essential character of
American life.9 Invocations of the negative model-the "totalitarian
comparison"-illustrated the point: permitting certain types of
police conduct foreshadowed the unmaking of a civilized and just
American society. These negative models, thus deployed, were used
to argue that much more was at issue in any given case than whether
a particular piece of evidence was seized properly; it was "[f]reedom
as the Constitution envisages it"'0 that was at stake.
The use of totalitarian comparisons to develop the content of the
constitutional criminal procedure amendments is an example of the
broader phenomenon of "translating" constitutional guarantees to
reflect the contemporary context in which they were considered. The
criminal procedure amendments to the United States Constitution
were drafted in response to particular examples of "tyranny."' 2 Yet
"tyranny" is necessarily an evolving concept; what are perceived to
be egregious abuses of government authority change over time.
Totalitarian comparisons reflected the concept of police excess
prevailing in the postwar period, which was based on a shared
9. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 961, 1010 (1992) ("Questions about constitutional meaning are thus, on
their face, a mixture of questions about what the United States is and what the United
States ought to do in given circumstances.").
10. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 354 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11. This Article argues that American views of the practices of other regimes played
a role in giving context to domestic constitutional norms. For a study of how external
views of American segregation affected domestic policy, see generally Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
12. See infra notes 182-210 and accompanying text.
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understanding of what role the police should play in a just American
society. Use of these comparisons reflected the need to understand
the guarantees of constitutional criminal procedure in light of the
most imminent and fearsome present-day threats posed by the abuse
of governmental authority. That this was a widely accepted approach
to these cases suggests a broad, albeit not expressly articulated,
acceptance of the "translation" principle.
Part II of this Article explores the phenomenon of totalitarian
comparison, which played a significant role in addressing numerous
issues of police power and authority in the wartime and postwar
eras.13 The negative model developed from a wartime and postwar
focus on Nazism 14 to a Cold War concentration on the Soviet Union.15
The comparisons continue intermittently in more contemporary
instances. 6 Having demonstrated that totalitarian comparison was a
significant phenomenon, Part III considers the multiple functions
that may have been served by the comparisons, arguing that they
served a substantive role by providing negative examples that
assisted in developing the content of the constitutional guarantees.17
II. EXPLORING THE PHENOMENON OF TOTALITARIAN
COMPARISON
Judges of the wartime era were bombarded, as were ordinary
citizens, with information about the horrors of the Nazi regime.
Hitler, they were told, was a "monster of wickedness," 8 and
information that seeped out of those countries under Nazi rule
confirmed that characterization. It was not only the militaristic
tactics of the Nazis that horrified, but their domestic policies as well,
including the use of police might to intimidate, browbeat, and
suppress any possibility, however slight, of domestic opposition.
Surveillance was common: ordinary citizens were "hounded,
terrorized, exploited."'19 People's "homes, their daily lives [were]
pried into and spied upon by the all pervading system of secret
political police."20 Reports from the occupied territories told of the
13. See infra notes 18-114 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 48-70 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 71-100 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 115-247 and accompanying text.
18. Winston Churchill, Introduction to THE SIXTH COLUMN: INSIDE THE NAZi-
OCCUPIED COUNTRIES at vii, ix (1942) [hereinafter THE SIXTH COLUMN]. This volume
was published in New York in 1942.
19. Id. at viii.
20. Id. One French handbill discussed the Nazi occupation:
[Vol. 761198
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"third degree,"' torture,22 and interrogation punctuated by
violence.' Writings reflected the Nazis' ideological insistence on
absolute control of thought and action,24 as well as their strategic use
of violence and brutality to effect social control.'
The abuses of civilians in their communities, horrifying as they
were, must have paled beside revelations of concentration camp
brutality. When the War Refugee Board' issued a detailed report in
late 1944 including eyewitness reports of mass murder at Birkenau
and Auschwitz (the first issued by a United States government
agency),27 the atrocities seemed " '[s]o revolting and diabolical ...
"THEY live in your house. THEY listen at your doors. THEY watch your
gestures. THEY inform against your remarks. THEY are quiet, so you don't
hear the famous clack of hobnailed boots which makes you prick your ear and
automatically close your mouth. Beware of all of THEM, men and women
alike."
Id. at 258 (quoting handbill).
21. See, e.g., ARVID FREDBORG, BEHIND THE STEEL WALL: A SWEDISH
JOURNALIST IN BERLIN 1941-1943, at 227-28 (1944) (describing Nazi use of drugs to
compel confession); HANS BERND GIsEViUs, To THE BITTER END 587 (1947) (describing
Nazi use of the third degree in interrogation of participants in the Putsch of 1943). The
"third degree" is defined as "the employment of methods which inflict suffering, physical
or mental, upon a person in order to obtain information about a crime." ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE, JR. ET AL., THE THIRD DEGREE: REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 19 (1969); see also ERNEST JEROME HOPKINS,
OUR LAWLESS POLICE 189-204 (1931) (describing the meaning of the term "third
degree").
22. See Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovakia, in THE SIXTH COLUMN, supra note 18, at 3, 4-
7; Theodore Broch, Norway-Part II, in THE SIXTH COLUMN, supra note 18, at 129, 130-
31.
23. See, e.g., THE GESTAPO AT WORK IN NORVAY 29-31(1942) (quoting a victim's
description of torture techniques used by the Gestapo during interrogation).
24. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BRADY, THE SPIRIT AND STRUCTURE OF GERMAN
FASCISM 39-44 (1937); WALLACE R. DEUEL, PEOPLE UNDER HITLER 135-55 (1942);
WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, THE NAZI STATE 108-14 (1943); FRANCIS HACKETT, WHAT MEIN
KAMPF MEANS TO AMERICA at xi-xx, 135-38 (1941); WILLIAM MONTGOMERY
MCGOVERN, FROM LUTHER TO HITLER: THE HISTORY OF FASCIST-NAZI POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 596-672 (1941); FRANZ NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH 37-38 (1942).
25. See, e.g., Terje Wold, Introduction to THE GESTAPO AT WORK IN NORWAY 5, 6
(1942) ("It is almost incredible, but according to the available evidence there can be no
doubt that ill treatment and torture form part of the routine investigation methods
employed by the Gestapo.").
26. The members of the War Refugee Board were the three highest ranking Cabinet
officials: the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and War. See George Polk, U.S. Charges
Nazis Tortured Millions to Death in Europe, N.Y. HERALD-TRIB., Nov. 26, 1944, at 1.
27. While "there was a reluctance to publish atrocity stories, in view of the
propaganda backfire following the First World War," George Connery, Two Million
Executed in Nazi Camps, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1944, at M2, the Board determined that
the information was accurate, concluding that there was "'every reason to believe that
these reports present a true picture of the frightful happenings in these camps. It is
making the reports public in the firm conviction that they would be read and understood
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that the minds of civilized people find it difficult to believe that [they]
have actually taken place.' "2 While the sheer numbers of dead, then
estimated at over 3.2 million for Auschwitz and Birkenau alone,
29
inspired unspeakable horror, the compelling voices of individual
accounts of torture, murder, and abuse personalized that horror.
Reports of the now well-known tales of victims ordered to undress
and led to believe they were going to bathe, only to be pushed into
the gas chambers, 0 of torture intended to defeat the morale of
prisoners,3' of purposeful sadism and cruelty,32 and of the
institutionalized nature of the exterminations 3 were emphasized.
The victims were blameless, had no trials, and posed no threat.'
4
The horrifying example of Nazism could not help but affect the
way the judiciary viewed American exercises of the police power.
The month after the War Refugee Board's revelations were widely
disseminated, Malinski v. New York3l5 came before the Supreme
Court. Malinski was suspected of participating in the murder of a
by all Americans,'" id. (quoting the War Refugee Board). For an exhaustive
investigation of American press coverage of the Holocaust, see generally DEBORAH E.
LIPSTADT, BEYOND BELIEF: THE AMERICAN PRESS AND THE COMING OF THE
HOLOCAUST 1933-45 (1986).
28. John H. Crider, U.S. Board Bares Atrocity Details Told by Witnesses at Polish
Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1944, at 1 (quoting report of the War Refugee Board); see
also Connery, supra note 27, at Ml ("In two years approximately two million persons-
equal to the entire population of West Virginia-were exterminated at two German
concentration camps.").
29. See Crider, supra note 28, at 1 (estimating that 1,765,000 Jews were killed at
Birkenau and 1,500,000 at Oswiecim (Auschwitz)).
30. See Connery, supra note 27, at M1; Crider, supra note 28, at 1.
31. See Polk, supra note 26, at 38 ("The German policy of torture, both physical and
mental, was described ... as having been scientifically devised to reduce the morale of the
prisoners so low that they killed one another as a novelty or sought an escape through
hopeless charges upon machine guns or high-voltage prison fences.").
32. See id. ("The Germans competed with one another, according to the report, in
devising new and more bestial torture for their victims. Women and children suffered the
same fate-or worse-than men. Many of the Germans at the death camps and
concentration pens were described as obvious pathological cases.").
33. See id. ("With brutality that made even Japanese atrocities seem pale by
comparison, the Germans made scientific use of chemistry, electricity and gunfire to kill
as many persons as possible with the least effort and expense.").
34. See id. The War Refugee Board's report contained no suggestion that the
Germans had put their victims to death for specified reasons-except to get them out of
the way. See id. Few if any of the prisoners were charged with any crimes, and none was
given a trial. See id.
35. 324 U.S. 401 (1945). Malinski was argued on December 4 and 5, 1944, and
decided on March 26, 1945. The report of the War Refugee Board, discussed supra in
notes 26-28 and accompanying text, was covered extensively in the popular press less than
10 days before the case was argued. See LIPSTADT, supra note 27, at 263-65.
[Vol. 761200
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police officer. 6 Arrested on his way to work, he was taken to a hotel,
where he was stripped naked. 7 After three hours, his shoes, socks,
and underwear were returned to him, but he was kept otherwise
undressed, and given only a blanket, until he confessed seven hours
later.3 Malinski was detained in the hotel for a total of four days
before being brought to the station house, where he made another
confession that was admitted against him. 39 At trial, the prosecutor
characterized Malinski as "'not hard to break' "40 and described the
suspect's treatment at the hands of the police with evident
enthusiasm:
"Why this talk about being undressed? Of course, they had
a right to undress him to look for bullet scars, and keep the
clothes off him. That was quite proper police procedure.
That is some more psychology-let him sit around with a
blanket on him, humiliate him there for a while; let him sit
in the corner, let him think he is going to get a
shellacking."'"
Malinski's conviction was reversed by a divided Supreme Court
in 1945.42 The vision of an American criminal suspect, cowering
naked in fear of humiliation and physical violence at the hands of
police, took on a new cast in light of the times.43 Dissenting in part,
36. See Malinski, 324 U.S. at 402.
37. See id. at 403. The state apparently proffered two justifications for this conduct:
one, that "Malinski was stripped so that he might be examined for bullet wounds,"
although "[h]e remained [naked] several hours-much longer than any such physical
examination could possibly justify," id. at 405; and two, that he might otherwise try to
escape, though that did not explain why his clothes were returned to him after the first
confession, see id. at 423-24 (Rutedge, J., dissenting in part).
38. See id. at 403.
39. See i& at 403-04.
40. Id. at 407 (quoting the prosecutor).
41. Id. (quoting the prosecutor).
42. See id. at 412. Malinski's treatment outraged Justice Murphy:
The subhuman psychology applied by the police to Malinski began soon after his
arrest on October 23. He was stripped, humiliated and threatened with a
shellacking. He was questioned throughout the day and was denied the benefit
of counsel, relatives or friends. This succeeded in breaking Malinski's will,
which the prosecutor boasted "was not hard to break," and the police were able
to extract an oral confession from him. But this was not enough; the police
wanted a written confession. So they continued to hold the "broken" Malinski
until such a confession was forthcoming on October 27. During this period he
was illegally held without being arraigned, was questioned at frequent intervals
and saw no one save his questioners.... The only concession made to him was
the privilege of wearing all his clothes.
Id. at 432-33 (Murphy, J., dissenting in part).
43. This may have been particularly true in light of the fact that, as Justice Murphy
pointed out, Malinski and his codefendant were "of Jewish ancestry," id. at 433-34
1998] 1201
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Justice Murphy made explicit mention of the dangers inherent in
applying such methods to criminal investigation, insisting, in his
separate opinion, that the Constitution requires that coercion or fear
automatically invalidate subsequent confessions absent proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that the atmosphere of fear has been dispelled.
44
"Otherwise," he wrote, "we might as well discard all pretense to a
civilized and humane system of criminal justice and adopt without
further ado the terroristic police practices of certain past and present
tyrannies in other parts of the world."'45 This proud claim to a
"civilized and humane system of criminal justice," and the possibility
that the police practices in Malinski opened the door to the creation
of a terroristic tyranny, supported the conclusion that the admission
of Malinski's confession violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
4 6
Malinski was not the first case in which the Court suggested that
tyranny in other parts of the world was relevant to the
constitutionality of police practices. During the wartime and postwar
period, the courts began to focus not only on the history from which
the constitutional protections sprung, but also on current events, and
(Murphy, J., dissenting in part), and the prosecutor's remarks to the jury-that Malinski
was a "'jerk from the East Side' " and came from "'the lower east side of Manhattan,
where your life is not worth a pretzel,'" id. at 434 (Murphy, J., dissenting in part)
(quoting the prosecutor), "were indicative of a desire to appeal to racial and religious
bigotry," id (Murphy, J., dissenting in part). These "[b]razen appeals relating to [the
defendants'] race or faith," Justice Murphy noted, "are the direct antithesis of every
principle of American justice and fair-play." Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting in part). This
reaction may have flowed from Murphy's participation in the National Committee against
Nazi Persecution and Extermination of the Jews (later the American Anti-Bigotry
Committee), an organization of non-Jews formed in early 1944 to combat anti-Semitism.
See SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 230-31 (1984); see also J.
WOODFORD HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY 353 (1968) (discussing Murphy's activity
on the Committee). Murphy was active both in seeking support to save overseas Jews
and in speaking and publishing broadly about the dangers of anti-Semitism. See FINE,
supra, at 232-33. Murphy's willingness to "raise[ his voice against the Holocaust abroad
and anti-Semitism at home while other prominent Americans remained silent," id. at 233,
was especially interesting in light of his own suspicions about Jews. Murphy had been a
longtime friend of the anti-Semitic Father Charles E. Coughlin, though their relations
cooled after 1936. See HOWARD, supra, at 113 n.h. "'I do not like Jews,'" one of
Murphy's biographers quotes him as saying, " 'until some one jumps on them.'" FINE,
supra, at 230 (quoting Justice Murphy); see also HOWARD, supra, at 269 (quoting similar
language).
44. See Malinski, 324 U.S. at 433 (Murphy, J., dissenting in part).
45. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting in part).
46. See id. (Murphy, J., dissenting in part). For a recent, thorough re-evaluation of
the pre-Miranda coerced confession cases, see Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before
Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2221 (1996) (noting the Supreme Court's analogy
between police interrogation and an "inquisitorial" system).
[Vol. 761202
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to consider American police conduct in light of the contemporary
understanding of European fascism. The Supreme Court, in
particular, began to articulate Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment principles based in part on the need to differentiate
American justice from the totalitarian example.4 7
A. World War II and Postwar Periods
At first, references to totalitarian excesses were subtle. In
Chambers v. Florida,' decided in 1940, the Court overturned the
admission of a confession on due process grounds.49 Writing for the
majority, Justice Black noted that "tyrannical governments had
immemorially utilized dictatorial criminal procedure and punishment
to make scape goats of the weak, or of helpless political, religious, or
racial minorities and those who differed, who would not conform and
who resisted tyranny."50 The Court drew an understated parallel
between English tyranny in the colonial era and modem
totalitarianism.5'
47. This Article focuses on Supreme Court opinions. The Court, as primary expositor
of constitutional doctrine, was the most significant-and the most widely read-voice on
the subject, and the Supreme Court's extensive use of totalitarian comparisons seems to
me most noteworthy. I do, however, refer to use of these comparisons in other courts
from time to time.
48. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
49. See id. at 241. Police arrested Chambers and his codefendants, along with a large
number of other black men, after the robbery and murder of an elderly white man in a
small town in Florida. See id. at 229. The "suspects"-between 25 and 40 in number-
were moved to the Dade County jail, purportedly under fear of mob violence, and were
subjected to intensive interrogation for a week. See id. at 229-30. The four petitioners in
Chambers ultimately "broke" and gave numerous confessions, the last of which were
satisfactory to the prosecutor. See id. at 231-35.
50. Id. at 236.
51. The Court noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, like
that of the Fifth,
was intended to guarantee procedural standards adequate and appropriate, then
and thereafter, to protect, at all times, people charged with or suspected of crime
by those holding positions of power and authority.... From the popular hatred
and abhorrence of illegal confinement, torture and extortion of confessions of
violations of the "law of the land" evolved the fundamental idea that no man's
life, liberty or property be forfeited as criminal punishment ... until there had
been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice,
passion, excitement and tyrannical power.
Id.
Issues of racism also permeate Justice Black's multilayered opinion. A number of
the early coerced confession cases, Chambers and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936), among them, stem from the Court's evident concern about police abusing and
overpowering black defendants in order to obtain confessions. See Monrad G. Paulsen,
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412 & n.7 (1954).
The concern about the accuracy of confessions that characterized the early due process
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But references to Nazi tyranny, and the need to distinguish the
American constitutional regime, soon became unmistakable. Justices
expressed the determined view that America could not be allowed to
slide down the totalitarian path, as well as the smug assurance that
such abuses could not possibly happen here. In Johnson v. United
States,52 Justice Jackson made such an argument to support the
fundamental importance of the warrant requirement: "Any other
rule," Justice Jackson argued, "would undermine the right of the
people to be secure in their 'persons, houses, papers and effects' and
would obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between
our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the
police-state where they are the law. '53 The message was clear: The
horrors of totalitarianism loomed large, and the Fourth Amendment
played a vital role in maintaining those protections critical to life in a
free society:54
Justice Frankfurter was evidently in agreement. In Wolf v.
Colorado,55 he wrote:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police-which is at the core of the Fourth
cases was related in part to the role that racism played in the actions of law enforcement.
Justice Black commented in Chambers that
[t]he testimony of centuries, in governments of varying kinds over populations of
different races and beliefs, stood as proof that physical and mental torture and
coercion had brought about the tragically unjust sacrifices of some who were the
noblest and most useful of their generations. The rack, the thumbscrew, the
wheel, solitary confinement, protracted questioning and cross questioning, and
other ingenious forms of entrapment of the helpless or unpopular had left their
wake of mutilated bodies and shattered minds along the way to the cross, the
guillotine, the stake and the hangman's noose. And they who have suffered
most from secret and dictatorial proceedings have almost always been the poor,
the ignorant, the numerically weak, the friendless, and the powerless.
Chambers, 309 U.S. at 237-38. While the rack, the thumbscrew, the wheel, and the
guillotine were the tools of earlier tyrannies, solitary confinement, protracted questioning,
and the hangman's noose were equally the province of sheriffs in the South. For
discussion of the racism concerns that motivated the due process cases, see Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 838-42 (1994),
and William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393,
438-39 (1995).
52. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Johnson addressed whether officers who smelled opium
coming from a hotel room were authorized to enter the room without a warrant to arrest
its occupant. See id. at 12-13. The Court held that a warrant was required. See id. at 17.
53. Id. It has been suggested that totalitarian comparisons were used mostly by
Justice Jackson after his experience as a Nuremberg prosecutor. This claim is discussed
infra in Part III.A.1.
54. For a discussion of "calls to identity"-arguments framed by reference to the
reader's identity-in Supreme Court opinions, see Eisgruber, supra note 9, at 968-73.
55. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1204 [Vol. 76
1998] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1205
Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore
implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such
enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause. The knock at the door, whether by day or by night,
as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely
on the authority of the police, did not need the commentary
of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the
conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the
basic constitutional documents. 6
Totalitarian comparisons were not always "successful," in the
sense that their users immediately achieved the desired outcome in
particular cases5 7 Indeed, the comparisons often were used most
forcefully in dissent, where they were employed in ardent defense of
personal dignity and individual liberty against encroaching tyranny
and despotism. Their use in dissent stressed the importance of
limiting police authority in maintaining the core values of American
society. "[T]he protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment,"
Justice Frankfurter wrote, "is not an outworn bit of Eighteenth
Century romantic rationalism but an indispensable need for a
democratic society ... because of its important bearing in
maintaining a free society and avoiding the dangers of a police
state. ' 58 Dissenters contrasted regimes where unfettered search and
56. Id. at 27-28; see also id. (holding that while evidence secured by federal actors in
violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in federal court, the same rule did
not apply to evidence seized in violation of the amendment by state actors).
57. The relationship between these comparisons and ultimate outcomes, however, is
considerably more complicated. Many of the cases in which totalitarian comparisons
were used in the dissent and rejected by the majority were later overruled. See, e.g., Wolf,
338 U.S. at 42-44 (Murphy, J., dissenting); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 161
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768
(1969); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 142 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). While the
comparisons may not have been immediately outcome-determinative in the majority of
cases, they were part of a process of law development which resulted in outcomes more
consistent with the comparisons than may have first appeared. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY,
DIVISION AND DIscORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE AND VINSON 1941-1953,
at 220 (1997) (noting that the Court in the late 1940s "set the groundwork for the great
due process revolution of the Warren era," but "did so hesitatingly, and in the end it
would be the dissents of Black and Douglas that would carry the day").
58. Harris, 331 U.S. at 161 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Harris held that the doctrine
of search incident to lawful arrest authorized the search of an arrestee's apartment. See
id. at 151-53. Harris was arrested on suspicion of mail fraud. See id. at 148. In ransacking
his house "incident" to his arrest, agents came upon forged and altered selective service
documents, for possession of which Harris was ultimately convicted. See id. at 149.
Justice Murphy's dissent in Harris also relied upon totalitarian comparison: "To
break and enter, to engage in unauthorized and unreasonable searches, to destroy all the
rights to privacy in an effort to uproot crime may suit the purposes of despotic power, but
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seizure prevailed, which intimidated and damaged the spirits of their
citizens in a manner fundamentally incompatible with the American
way of life. Justice Jackson asserted:
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing
a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and
putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and
seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the
arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only
briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed
of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to
know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity
and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and
possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search
and seizure by the police.59
The reference clearly invoked the totalitarian government of Nazi
Germany to the reader of the time.6'
those methods cannot abide the pure atmosphere of a free society." Id. at 192 (Murphy,
J., dissenting). He further noted:
Lawless methods of law enforcement are frequently effective in uncovering
crime, especially where tyranny reigns, but they are not to be countenanced
under our form of government....
The principle established by the Court today can be used as easily by
some future government determined to suppress political opposition under the
guise of sedition as it can be used by a government determined to undo forgers
and defrauders. History is not without examples of the outlawry of certain
political, religious and economic beliefs and the relentless prosecution of those
who dare to entertain such beliefs. And history has a way of repeating itself. It
therefore takes no stretch of the imagination to picture law enforcement officers
arresting those accused of believing, writing or speaking that which is
proscribed, accompanied by a thorough ransacking of their homes as an
"incident" to the arrest in an effort to uncover "anything" of a seditious nature.
Under the Court's decision, the Fourth Amendment no longer stands as a bar to
such tyranny and oppression.
Id. at 194 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Murphy later noted in
correspondence: "'From now on you had better burn all your papers for once in your
home on a trumped up charge the police can search from cellar to garret.... That is not
free America to me.'" FINE, supra note 43, at 492 (quoting Letter from Justice Murphy
to Joan Cuddihy (May 19, 1947)). This was consistent with views that a "notion that
democracy was in a deadly contest with totalitarian isms [sic] had imbued [Murphy's]
thinking." HOWARD, supra note 43, at 271.
59. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
The majority in Brinegar rejected the defendant's claim that an automobile search was
improper because it was not based upon probable cause. See id. at 176-77; see also
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1065 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting from
Brinegar).
60. Justice Jackson's comment about having "dwelt and worked" among a people
deprived of freedom from arbitrary search was a reference to the time he spent as a
prosecutor at Nuremberg. See infra Part III.A.1.
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The use of broad, invasive searches was one perceived
characteristic of tyrannical regimes. The use of eavesdropping,
wiretapping, and other forms of electronic surveillance was another.
In United States v. On Lee,6' Judge Jerome Frank dissented from the
Second Circuit's conclusion that evidence obtained by monitoring a
conversation between the defendant and an informant using a radio
transmitter was constitutionally admissible.62 He argued that such
practices made possible a descent into the horrors of
totalitarianism-or perhaps Orwell's 1984:
The practice of broadcasting private inside-the-house
conversations through concealed radios is singularly
terrifying when one considers how this snide device has
already been used in totalitarian lands. Under Hitler, when
it became known that the secret police planted dictaphones
in houses, members of families often gathered in bathrooms
to conduct whispered discussions of intimate affairs, hoping
thus to escape the reach of the sending apparatus. Orwell,
depicting the horrors of a future completely regimented
society, could think of no more frightening instrument there
to be employed than the "telescreen" compulsorily installed
in every house .... Such a mechanical horror may soon be
the dubious gift of applied science. My colleagues' decision,
by legitimizing the use of such a future horror, invites it.63
61. 193 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
62. See id. at 309.
63. Id. at 317 (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court, in an
evident rejection of Judge Frank's impassioned opinion, affirmed On Lee. See United
States v. On Lee, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942),
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), the Court rejected a
claim that use of a sensitive microphone to overhear conversations in a suspect's home
violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 136. In vigorous dissent, Justice Murphy first
discussed briefly "the direct and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by
our forebears and which inspired the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 139 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). In closing, Justice Murphy transitioned to a more impassioned and
contemporary brand of comparative argument:
The benefits that accrue from this and other articles of the Bill of Rights are
characteristic of democratic rule. They are among the amenities that distinguish
a free society from one in which the rights and comforts of the individual are
wholly subordinated to the interests of the state. We cherish and uphold them as
necessary and salutary checks on the authority of government. They provide a
standard of official conduct which the courts must enforce. At a time when the
nation is called upon to give freely of life and treasure to defend and preserve
the institutions of democracy and freedom, we should not permit any of the
essentials of freedom to lose vitality through legal interpretations that are
restrictive and inadequate for the period in which we live.
Id. at 142 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 161
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of Fourth Amendment
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The use of these comparisons was not limited to Fourth
Amendment cases. The comparisons seem to have been most
persuasive-or at least most consistent with the immediate
outcomes-in the coerced confession cases. Malinski v. New York'
was one such case. Ashcraft v. Tennessee65 was another. In Ashcraft,
the Court overturned the admission of a confession given after thirty-
six hours of continuous questioning,66 clearly indicating the Court's
abhorrence for governments that coerced confessions from their
citizens, and its view that the Constitution did not permit such tactics.
Writing for the Court, Justice Black stated:
The Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against
the conviction of any individual in an American court by
means of a coerced confession. There have been, and are
now, certain foreign nations with governments dedicated to
an opposite policy: governments which convict individuals
with testimony obtained by police organizations possessed
of an unrestrained power to seize persons suspected of
crimes against the state, hold them in secret custody, and
wring from them confessions by physical or mental torture.
So long as the Constitution remains the basic law of our
Republic, America will not have that kind of government.67
That this was speaking to shared context was evident: while the
references to "certain foreign nations" are oblique and unsupported,
the reader's understanding is assumed.6
protections to the maintenance of a free society), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969).
64. 324 U.S. 401 (1945); see supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text (discussing
Malinski).
65. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
66. See id. at 153.
67. Id. at 155 (footnote omitted). Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in
Ashcraft, Justice Jackson was a strenuous dissenter, though he used comparable
arguments in other contexts. See infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text (discussing
Jackson's arguments). Justice Stone asked Justice Black to consider changing his
language in light of the "obvious comparison" to America's wartime enemy. HOWARD
BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK, WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS, AND AMERICA'S CONSTrIONAL REVOLUTION 221 (1992) (citing
Memorandum from Harlan F. Stone to Hugo Black (Mar. 22, 1944)). The request was
evidently denied. Others have attributed Justice Black's views to the rise of
totalitarianism. See, e.g., Irving Dilliard, The Individual and the Bill of Absolute Rights, in
HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT: A SYMPOSIUM 97, 98 (Stephen Parks
Strickland ed., 1967).
68. The coerced confession cases were not solely the product of anti-totalitarianism.
Concern about the use of third degree tactics, particularly against African-American
suspects, was a significant factor in these cases. See supra note 51. Ashcraft himself was a
white businessman, a fact which Professor Catherine Hancock has argued required the
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Not only judges thought these comparisons pertinent. Counsel
evidently did as well, since the comparisons were invoked frequently
in the advocacy of the time. The briefs in many of these cases
positively dripped with anti-totalitarian hyperbole, including
impassioned calls to uphold the pillars of free society against the
threat of fascism. One advocate argued in the petition for certiorari
in Brinegar v. United States that "[t]he type of conduct approved by
the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, if followed, [would give]
rise to the establishment of an American gestapo."69  "The Nazi
system of justice," one attorney wrote, "with its concomittant [sic]
methods of inducing confessions, has no place in our jurisprudence
.... Important it is indeed to punish crime: but far more imperative
is it that our criminal procedure be not polluted with foreign
methods, alien to our concept of justice and inconsistent with our
system of government." 70 Then, as now, though, language was not
used without purpose; the advocates invoked these arguments
passionately because they believed them persuasive.
development of a per se rule holding excessively long interrogations inherently coercive
in lieu of a test requiring a showing of "personal vulnerability" of the defendant. See
Hancock, supra note 46, at 2223-26. Yet the two are related. Judicial unwillingness to
tolerate racism was heightened in the face of the full comprehension of Nazi genocide,
and attacking governmental abuse in general may have been a strategic vehicle to attack
racism. For a discussion of how the racist element of European fascism inspired domestic
awareness of American racism, see David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic
Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J.
741,752-59,762-67,778-79 (1981).
69. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22-23, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949) (No. 12). Counsel analogized the government's activity in Brinegar to historical
tyranny and modem totalitarianism:
It is a reincarnation and legalization of those practices which originally gave rise
to the demand for these constitutional safeguards. The soil of Europe today
cries out with the blood of free men sacrificed upon an altar erected out of the
degradation of the basic rights we here seek to maintain.
Id. at 23.
70. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 35, Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945)
(No. 367). In his brief to the Supreme Court, Malinski's attorney argued:
This nation is engaged in a titanic world-wide struggle. Its chief object is
to destroy arbitrary and totalitarian governments, which arbitrarily deny
ordinary natural rights, and to make the blessing of democracy secure for all the
peoples of the world. Of what avail to sacrifice the flower of the youth of our
country, to pour out unmeasurable treasure, to create burdens to be borne by
many future generations to secure those objectives, if some of the more
detestable phases of Nazism and Fascism are to be tolerated, even encouraged
and approved in our own blessed land? Perish the thought! This sanctuary of
freedom, liberty and democracy must be preserved inviolate. The one hope is
this tribunal. Failure here, means disaster everywhere else.
Petitioner's Brief at 44, Malinski (No. 367).
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B. From Postwar to Cold War
While the use of totalitarian comparisons in criminal procedure
jurisprudence continued into the early Cold War period, the villain
invoked for the negative comparison gradually changed. Instead of
Nazism, the evil comparison often became the Soviet menace-or
some undefined conglomeration of "totalitarianism.' 71  The
argument that police tactics created the potential for fascism evolved
into a claim that police abuses made us no better than our
72Communist enemies.
The American view of the Soviet Union made these comparisons
possible. Voluminous information encouraged a uniformly negative
view of Soviet police power and the Soviet justice system,
71. Some references are so obscure, so cautious, or so general that they cannot be
associated with any particular regime. Instead, "totalitarian" regimes are lumped
together in a single despised category. For example, Justice Brennan drew a parallel
between the practices of totalitarian governments in general and American police making
unannounced entries "at any hour of the day or night" into homes for "any crime
involving evidence of a kind which police experience indicates might be quickly destroyed
or jettisoned." Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 61-62 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part). He concluded that "there is ... no logical ground for distinguishing between the
stealthy manner in which the entry in this case was effected, and the more violent manner
usually associated with totalitarian police of breaking down the door or smashing the
lock." Id. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
Judges may have been inclined to lump the Nazis and Communists together.
Authors Lee K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson have argued that many Americans, both
before and after World War II, were inclined to view Nazi and Soviet domination as
essentially similar, including, inter alia, the exercise of police power in the two regimes.
See Lee K. Adler & Thomas G. Paterson, Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and
Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's-1950's, 75 AM. HIST. REV.
1046 (1970). As one example of the American perspective, Adler and Paterson referred
to Arthur Bliss Lane who, as American Ambassador to Poland from 1945 to 1947, had
once commented "that the Russian security police copied Gestapo tactics. Speaking of
persons brutally beaten and tortured by police, Lane told a radio audience that 'the same
terror of a knock at the door in the dead of night exists today as it did during the Nazi
occupation.'" Id. at 1054 (quoting Ambassador Lane). Adler and Paterson also quote
President Truman as stating that "'there isn't any difference between the totalitarian
Russian government and the Hitler government.... They are all alike. They are police
governments-police state governments.'" Id. (quoting President Truman).
72. The comparisons were usually, but not invariably, to the Soviet Union. For a
comparison to Castro's Cuba, see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). The Court held
that televising the trial of a prominent Texas financier accused of swindling violated his
right to due process. See id. at 535. Concurring separately, Chief Justice Warren wrote:
"Our memories are short indeed if we have already forgotten the wave of horror that
swept over this country when Premier Fidel Castro conducted his prosecutions before
18,000 people in Havana Stadium." Id. at 572 (Warren, C.J., concurring). The Chief
Justice also referred to the Soviet Union, comparing Estes's trial to the Soviets' trial of
American espionage suspect Francis Gary Powers. See id. at 575 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
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engendered by the experiences of the Stalinist era.73 The Soviet
Union was viewed as profoundly "other,"74 morally bankrupt,
73. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, Introduction to THE TRIAL OF THE U2, at xi (1960)
(noting that the trial of Francis Gary Powers, an American pilot, for espionage was in part
a trial of the Soviet legal system). Professor Berman noted:
The notorious abuses of legal procedures by the Soviet leadership in the past...
had led to a widespread belief that any Soviet court proceeding is bound to be a
sham and a mere propaganda stunt. It was predicted by many American
commentators that Powers would be "brainwashed" and that he would not
receive a fair trial. Essays were published in leading newspapers and magazines
in the West which stated that under Soviet law the accused in a criminal case is
at the mercy of the prosecution, that there is no presumption of innocence, that
the indictment is tantamount to a conviction, that the accused has no right to
counsel, that if defense counsel is permitted he is merely an agent of the state
and in effect an assistant to the prosecutor, and that the judges receive their
instructions from the Communist Party.... Thus it was widely concluded that
Powers would simply be used as a whipping-boy in order to publicize Soviet
attacks upon United States policies.
Id. Professor Berman went on to argue that, while the Soviet legal system's uses of the
trial as an "instrumento of the social and political objectives of the state" led to some
inevitable conflict between individual and collective justice, "most (though not all) of the
basic principles of procedural justice" were observed. Id. at xii.
The American view of Soviet justice which Berman addressed was evident in
Powers's testimony at his trial. Powers testified that he had been given a poisoned needle
to enable him to commit suicide in the event he was captured and tortured by the Soviets:
Q. Who gave you the poison needle? A. It was given to me by Colonel Shelton
Q. For what purpose? A. In case I was captured, tortured and couldn't stand the
torture and would rather be dead.
Q. [T]hey gave you the needle to kill yourself? A. If I was tortured.
Q. You were told torture would be used in the Soviet Union? A. I don't
remember being told but I expected it.
Q. Were you tortured? A. No.
Q. How did the interrogation authorities treat you? A. I have been treated very
nice.
Id. at 38.
Comparison to the Soviet Union, in turn, became a basis for critique of the American
system. For example, Abraham Blumberg noted that in the Soviet judicial system, "the
'trial' is simply a recapitulation of the data collected by the pre-trial investigator. Notions
of a trial being a 'tabula rasa' and presumptions of innocence are wholly alien to Soviet
notions of justice." ABRAHAM S. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 37 (1974). He then
asked rhetorically, "How closely does 'bureaucratic due process' and its accompanying
non-adversary system pose a discomforting parallel to the Soviet system, wherein 'the
closer the investigation resembles the finished script, the better .... '" Id. (quoting
GEORGE FEIFER, JUSTICE IN MoscoW 86 (1964)).
74. DAvID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER
TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER 21-22 (1978). Caute noted:
In America there was an artificial straining and striving for social
cohesion and national unity. In 1951, for example, the American Heritage
Foundation summoned delegates from the forty-eight states to gather and draft
a Re-Declaration of Faith in the American Dream. Bells were to peal not only
as a symbol of high morale, but also as a "gesture of defiance to the Enemy"-
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irrational, and aggressive.75
Again, these comparisons were invoked in opposition to
challenged police practices; again, the argument was made that such
practices were fundamentally inconsistent with the character of
American society. An example of such an argument can be found in
Berger v. New York.76 The Court there struck down a New York
statute authorizing electronic eavesdropping without requiring
adequate particularization of the material to be intercepted.77 Justice
Douglas, concurring, was vehement in arguing that gathering
evidence through electronic surveillance violated the Constitution.
Such tactics, he argued, would be permissible only if the Constitution
were amended-"a step," he argued,
that would take us closer to the ideological group we profess
to despise. Until the amending process ushers us into that
kind of totalitarian regime, I would adhere to the protection
of privacy which the Fourth Amendment, fashioned in
Congress and submitted to the people, was designed to
afford the individual.8
Justice Douglas warned frequently of the dire implications of
police overreaching.79 "[M]ust everyone live in fear that every word
the Alien, the Nonconformist, the Critical Force. Here, then, was a palpable
lack of trust in the Other, who he was, where he came from, what dark gods he
might worship in his strange language, and whether he qualified as a good
American or a dangerous "un-American."
Id. at 21.
75. See, e.g., ZEVEDEI BARBu, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP 6 (1956). Barbu's
book is a study of the psychology of democracy, fascism, and communism. He deemed
periods of democratization as "dominated by reason," id. at 5, and fascism to be "[a]
social structure based on emotional primitive bonds, emotional attitudes towards
authority, irrational and magic ways of thinking," id. at 6. Thus while a "drive towards
rationality [characterizes] the democratic way of life, Fascism is a symptom of regression
in group behaviour." Id. Barbu compared Communism to Nazi fascism: "Nazism results
from the irrational, Communism from the over-rational factors of contemporary
civilization." Id. at 145. According to Barbu, "ruthlessness, aggression, submission, and,
above all, a great capacity for hatred," not merely a willing adherence to Marxist
economic philosophy, made an individual "eligible and valuable for the [Communist]
Party." Id at 207. "This shows that there are a series of other mental factors which play
a greater part than the rational ones in the process of becoming a Communist and in the
specific structure of a Communist group." Id.
76. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
77. See id. at 55-59.
78. Id. at 67-68 (Douglas, J., conctirring).
79. See United States v. White, 401-U.S. 745, 764-65 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 352-54 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In White,
the Court held that a radio transmission of a conversation with an informant was not a
Fourth Amendment search. See White, 401 U.S. at 749. In Osborn, the defendant was
accused of attempting to bribe the jury in Jimmy Hoffa's case. See Osborn, 385 U.S. at
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he speaks may be transmitted or recorded and later repeated to the
entire world," he asked.8" "I can imagine nothing that has a more
chilling effect on people speaking their minds and expressing their
views on important matters. The advocates of that regime should
spend some time in totalitarian countries and learn firsthand the kind
of regime they are creating here.""
324-25. The government recorded conversations between Osborn and an informant,
using the recordings to obtain Osborn's conviction. See id. at 326. The Court sustained
the conviction on the ground that the transmissions were conducted pursuant to judicial
authorization. See id. at 330-31. Justice Douglas was eloquent in dissent: "Once
electronic surveillance ... is added to the techniques of snooping which this sophisticated
age has developed, we face the stark reality that the walls of privacy have broken down
and all the tools of the police state are handed over to our bureaucracy on a constitutional
platter." Id. at 349 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He continued:
The dangers posed by wiretapping and electronic surveillance strike at the very
heart of the democratic philosophy. A free society is based on the premise that
there are large zones of privacy into which the Government may not intrude
except in unusual circumstances....
... The time may come when no one can be sure whether his words are
being recorded for use at some future time; when everyone will fear that his
most secret thoughts are no longer his own, but belong to the Government;
when the most confidential and intimate conversations are always open to eager,
prying ears. When that time comes, privacy, and with it liberty, will be gone. If
a man's privacy can be invaded at will, who can say he is free? If his every word
is taken down and evaluated, or if he is afraid every word may be, who can say
he enjoys freedom of speech? If his every association is known and recorded, if
the conversations with his associates are purloined, who can say he enjoys
freedom of association? When such conditions obtain, our citizens will be afraid
to utter any but the safest and most orthodox thoughts; afraid to associate with
any but the most acceptable people. Freedom as the Constitution envisages it
will have vanished.
Id. at 352-54 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80. White, 401 U.S. at 764 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 764-65 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas was not alone. In the
same case, Justice Harlan argued in dissent that this practice was fundamentally
incompatible with a democratic form of government. He noted that the Court's opinion
implied that "uncontrolled consensual surveillance in an electronic age is a tolerable
technique of law enforcement, given the values and goals of our political system." Id. at
785 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Quoting Alan Westin, Justice Harlan wrote:
"It is obvious that the political system in each society will be a fundamental
force in shaping its balance of privacy, since certain patterns of privacy,
disclosure, and surveillance are functional necessities for particular kinds of
political regime. This is shown most vividly by contrasting privacy in the
democratic and the totalitarian state."
Id. at 785 n.21 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 23 (1967)). Westin continues with a description of the "consolidation phase"
of totalitarian regimes, in which "[a]utonomous units are denied privacy, traditional
confidential relationships are destroyed, surveillance systems and informers are widely
installed, and thorough dossiers are compiled on millions of citizens." WESTIN, supra, at
23. He contrasts totalitarian societies, which require "a social balance favoring disclosure
and surveillance over privacy" with liberal democratic societies, which require "a balance
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Totalitarian comparisons were used in Fifth as well as Fourth
Amendment cases. The Fifth Amendment cases addressed by the
Court during the postwar period arose in the context of the
McCarthy committee hearings and its attempts to expose purported
Communist infiltration.82 In some people's minds, assertion of the
that ensures strong citadels of individual and group privacy and limits both disclosure and
surveillance." Id. at 24.
Like Justices Douglas and Harlan, Justice Frankfurter also used totalitarian
comparisons in electronic surveillance cases. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 142-49
(1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In Irvine, police suspected the defendant of illegal
bookmaking but lacked sufficient proof. See id. at 130-31. They had a locksmith make a
key to Irvine's home, installed concealed microphones inside the home, and made two
subsequent entries to reposition the microphones more optimally until they succeeded in
intercepting incriminating conversations. See id. These conversations were used against
Irvine at his trial and were held admissible because the exclusionary rule, under Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), was
not then constitutionally required in state courts. See Irvine, 347 U.S. at 132-33. Justice
Frankfurter commented:
A sturdy, self-respecting democratic community should not put up with lawless
police and prosecutors. "Our people may tolerate many mistakes of both intent
and performance, but, with unerring instinct, they know that when any person is
intentionally deprived of his constitutional rights those responsible have
committed no ordinary offense. A crime of this nature, if subtly encouraged by
failure to condemn and punish, certainly leads down the road to totalitarianism."
Id. at 149 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting J. Edgar Hoover, Statement of Director J.
Edgar Hoover, 21 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Sept. 1952, at 1). Similarly, Justice
Douglas wrote in his autobiography:
I speak of the Fourth Amendment designed by James Otis to keep government
agents from ransacking a man's home or his files. But now the ransacking can
be done electronically with no physical intrusion. Must the law stand still while
politicians, hungry for more power, seek to level all the necessary barricades to
liquidate or destroy their opposition?
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 179 (1980). These comments are particularly interesting in light
of the new view that Douglas changed his position in the late 1940s, becoming more
sympathetic to Fourth Amendment claims. See, e.g., BALL & COOPER, supra note 67, at
211 (1992); Leon D. Epstein, Justice Douglas: A Case Study in Judicial Review 231
(1948) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with the
University of Iowa College of Law library).
82. Between 1945 and 1957, over 3000 witnesses testified in public hearings before
the House Committee on Un-American Activities. See CAUTE, supra note 74, at 96. In
one poignant passage, Caute describes the Committee's hostility to witnesses' invocation
of their Fifth Amendment rights:
The Committee often refused to accept the Fifth Amendment; or persisted with
the same line of questioning even after the witness had invoked it; or insisted
that to take it was tantamount to confessing guilt. Said [Rep.] Kit Clardy in
Lansing, Michigan, in 1954, "I don't know of any innocent man that has ever
appeared before this Committee and invoked the Fifth Amendment ... "
Id. at 95. Not infrequently, committee members made known their disdain for witnesses
who sought to invoke their constitutional rights. On one occasion, when testimony was
interrupted by a witness's conference with his attorney, Representative J. Parnell Thomas
declared, "'The rights you have are the rights given you by this Committee. We will
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Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the
Congressional hearings carried with it the clear inference of guilt.8 3
In light of this interpretation of invocations of the Fifth Amendment,
discussions of the privilege and its importance to a free society were
impassioned.
Opponents of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, Judge Jerome Frank noted in United States v.
Grunewald disregard its importance
as a safeguard of the individual's "substantive" right of
privacy, a right to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy.
The totalitarian regimes scornfully reject that right. They
regard privacy as an offense against the state. Their goal is
utter depersonalization. They seek to convert all that is
private into the totally public, to wipe out all unique
"private worlds," leaving a "public world" only, a la
Orwell's terrifying book, "1984." They boast of the
resultant greater efficiency in obtaining all the evidence in
criminal prosecutions. We should know by now that their
vaunted efficiency too often yields unjust, cruel decisions,
based upon unreliable evidence procured at the sacrifice of
privacy. We should beware of moving in the direction of
totalitarian methods, as we will do if we eviscerate any of
the great constitutional privileges.85
determine what rights you have and what rights you have not got before the
Committee.'" Id. at 97.
83. From this inference came Senator McCarthy's use of the term "Fifth Amendment
Communist." See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 82 (1957); Erwin N. Griswold, The Individual and the Fifth Amendment, NEW
LEADER, Oct. 29, 1956, at 20,21.
84. 233 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
85. Id. at 580 (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). The issue in Grunewald was
whether a defendant who asserted the privilege against self-incrimination before the
grand jury, but who chose to testify at trial, could be asked on cross-examination about his
earlier assertion of the privilege. See id. at 571 (Frank, J., dissenting). The Second Circuit
held that he could. See id. at 568-69. The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion by
Justice Harlan. See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 424. Neither the majority opinion nor Justice
Black's concurrence invoked the totalitarian comparisons articulated in Judge Frank's
Second Circuit dissent.
George Orwell's 1984 plainly embodied American fears of totalitarianism.
Historians Adler and Paterson note:
Orwell's 1984, appearing at the time when American fears of totalitarianism had
become obsessive, did much to shape American thought and opinion. For
serious scholars and casual readers alike, the image of totalitarianism presented
in 1984 has been a model, as unreal and probably as significant as that created
by American leaders and the mass media from the war's end to the book's
publication in America in 1949.
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Both as a matter of principle and persuasion, the argument that in the
absence of the privilege we would become the oppressor we most
feared was articulated repeatedly.
Courts were not the only ones employing this comparative
approach. Legal scholarship also addressed the constitutional issues
in the context of the potential for totalitarianism inherent in
unfettered police power. Dean Erwin Griswold, 6 who used the
comparisons in a series of lectures about the Fifth Amendment
delivered in the evident shadow of the House Un-American
Activities Committee,8 may have been the comparisons' most
prominent expositor.' Dean Griswold's arguments reflected the
tension of speaking out to support the Fifth Amendment privilege in
Adler & Paterson, supra note 71, at 1063. The novel's capacity to horrify continues. In
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), Justice Brennan, dissenting from the Court's holding
that helicopter surveillance from 400 feet was not a Fourth Amendment search, see id. at
452, used 1984 to graphic effect:
I hope it will be a matter of concern to my colleagues that the police surveillance
methods they would sanction were among those described 40 years ago in
George Orwell's dread vision of life in the 1980's: "The black-mustachio'd face
gazed down from every commanding corner. There was one on the house front
immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption
said.... In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs,
hovered for an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving
flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people's windows."
Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 4 (1949)).
86. Griswold was dean of the Harvard Law School from 1946-67. See Envin
Nathaniel Griswold, 1904-1994, Program, A Service in Thanksgiving for the Life of Envin
Nathaniel Griswold, Harvard University (Mar. 10, 1995) [hereinafter Griswold Program].
87. These three lectures, directed specifically at abuses of legislative committees,
given in February, March, and October of 1954, were published in a volume, ERWIN N.
GRISWOLD, THE 5TH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955) [hereinafter GRISWOLD, THE 5TH
AMENDMENT]. The last lecture refers to the "great contributions which have been made
in recent months by such persons as, in the first instance, Joseph N. Welch, and later,
Senator Watkins and his associates." Id. at 73. Griswold's autobiography describes his
preparation of the speeches and the enthusiastic response his first speech received. See
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, OULD FIELDS, NEW CORNE: THE PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF A
TWENTIETH-CENTURY LAWYER 192-94 (1992). The speeches must have taken some
courage in light of the FBI's investigation of Griswold because, inter alia, of his
contributions to Alger Hiss's defense fund. See id. at 190; Griswold Program, supra note
86, at 8 (remarks of Dean Robert C. Clark) ("[Griswold] was an outspoken champion of
the Fifth Amendment at a time when such outspokenness could lead to virulent attack.").
88. See Sidney Hook, Logic and the Fifth Amendment, NEW LEADER, Oct. 1, 1956, at
12, 14 (noting that Griswold's book had "enormous influence not only on the lay public
but on recent legal decisions"); see also Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 671 (1968) ("In
the mid-1950's it was necessary to vindicate the privilege against self-incrimination ...
against the opprobrium that Senator Joseph McCarthy and others sought to heap on
many who properly invoked it ... and Dean Griswold earned the nation's gratitude by
speaking out as he did.").
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a climate in which it was perceived as a mere technical impediment to
the eradication of the Communist menace. 89  Griswold's
countermeasure was to invoke the privilege as a symbol of
individualistic democratic values, using Communism as the negative
comparison. The Fifth Amendment, he argued, reflected the
Founding Fathers' experience of tyranny, and
our belief in the importance of the individual, a symbol of
our highest aspirations. As such it is a clear and eloquent
expression of our basic opposition to collectivism, to the
unlimited power of the state. It would never be allowed by
communists, and thus it may well be regarded as one of the
signs which sets us off from communism.
90
The comparisons enabled Griswold to take a relatively strong stance
in support of the privilege while expressing demonstrably negative
views of Soviet totalitarianism. 91
89. The June 6, 1954 episode of Edward R. Murrow's See It Now television series
featured two law professors debating basic questions about the privilege, including
whether persons ought to be permitted to assert the privilege when testifying before
legislative committees and whether those asserting the privilege could properly be fired
from their jobs. See See It Now (CBS television broadcast, June 6,1954).
90. GRIsWOLD, THE 5TH AMENDMENT, supra note 87, at 81. The political
maneuvering at the heart of Griswold's speeches was manifest. He began by making clear
that while opposition to Communism was important, it was even more important not to
deviate from the constitutional values that distinguished the American system:
A method of anti-communism may be wholly contrary to our constitution and to
the rights and liberties which we have inherited from our forefathers and which
are one of the chief things which distinguish us from the communists today. We
will gain nothing in this country if we adopt the methods of the communists to
protect ourselves against communists.
Id. at 69-70. Griswold continued:
We usually think of the privilege against self-incrimination either in historical
terms, in the light of past tyrannies, or in terms of the embarrassment that a
witness at a Congressional hearing may experience as a result of the exposure of
political mistakes. Let us look, though, at the reverse side of the coin in terms of
the standard operating procedures of the police states which have brought the
medieval techniques up to date. If we are not willing to let the Amendment be
invoked, where, over time, are we going to stop when police, prosecutors, or
chairmen want to get people to talk? Lurking in the background here are really
ugly dangers which might transform our whole system of free government.
Id. at 75. Griswold distinguished the "totalitarian mind" and that of the political
democrat:
"The totalitarian mind accepts all the means which promise the achievement of
its ends. A political democrat is ready to compromise some of his ideal ends for
the sake of renouncing means which would involve the sacrifice of human lives
or freedom. This is the major moral issue, dividing any totalitarian, be he
Communist or Fascist, from a genuine democrat."
Id. at 70 (quoting W.W. KULSKI, THE SOVIET REGIME: COMMUNISM IN PRACrICE 3 (4th
ed. 1963)).
91. For other scholarly references, see Monrad G. Paulsen, The Fourteenth
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As in the earlier cases, views that totalitarian comparisons
required a more expansive reading of constitutional limitations on
police practice did not always prevail. In Gallegos v. Nebraska,92 the
Court rejected the defendant's claim that his confession should be
excluded as the product of excessive pre-arraignment detention. 93
Justice Black invoked the comparisons in his dissent: "Americans
justly complain when their fellow citizens in certain European
countries are pounced upon at will by state police, held in jail
incommunicado, and later convicted of crime on confessions obtained
during such incarceration." 94 Yet the Court, Justice Black pointed
out, sustained the defendant's conviction though he, a Mexican
citizen who could not read or understand English, had been convicted
based on his confession.95 Justice Black wrote: "There are countries
where arbitrary arrests like this, followed by secret imprisonment and
systematic questioning until confessions are obtained, are still
recognized and permissible legal procedures.... My own belief is
that only by departure from the Constitution as properly interpreted
Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412 (1954) ("American police
practices are sometimes even strikingly parallel to those reported from totalitarian
countries."), and H. Frank Way, Jr., The Supreme Court and State Coerced Confessions,
12 J. PUB. L. 53, 66-67 (1963) ("We have pointed to our nation as one in which men are
free from arbitrary arrest and illegal detention by the state. We are a nation, unlike
Franco Spain or the Soviet Union, where men do not live in terror of a knock on the door
in the middle of the night.").
That these comparisons were perhaps the best offense for persons taking a critical
view of the witch-hunts is suggested by the October 20, 1953 broadcast of Edward R.
Murrow's See It Now television series, the opening salvo of Murrow's attack on Senator
McCarthy. The episode concerned an Air Force reservist who had been discharged as a
"security risk" based on allegations, contained in a sealed envelope which he was not
allowed to see, regarding his associations with members of his own family. See SEE IT
Now 31, 33 (Edward R. Murrow & Fred W. Friendly eds., 1955). The discharged
reservist's lawyer expressed outrage about the way his client had been treated:
"Now, this whole theory of guilt by relationship is something that was adopted
back in the thirteenth and fourteenth century [sic], and then abandoned as being
inhuman and cruel. It was later revived in Germany under Hitler and Himmler,
and it died when they died. Now the Air Force, for some unknown reason, has
revived this intolerable guilt by relationship, and this whole country is shocked
by reason thereof."
Id. (quoting See It Now (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 20,1953)).
92. 342 U.S. 55 (1951) (plurality opinion).
93. See id. at 65-68.
94. Id. at 73-74.
95. See id. at 74 (Black, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the majority position in
Gallegos, see infra note 145. Justice Black noted that the Texas authorities, at the request
of federal immigration officials, had arrested Gallegos and kept him in an eight-by-eight
foot cell with no windows, known as the "punishment room," until he confessed to the
murder of his paramour. See Gallegos, 342 U.S. at 74 (Black, J., dissenting).
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can America tolerate such practices."96 Again counsel raised these
comparisons, calling on the Court to distinguish American police
practice from that in the Soviet Union9 and arguing that the
principles at issue threatened "[t]the American way of life." 98
During the early Cold War period, then, the object of the
comparison shifted from Nazism to Soviet communism. Nonetheless,
the perceived excesses of totalitarianism, and the need to distinguish
a free America, were still asserted frequently99 in addressing whether
96. Gallegos, 342 U.S. at 74-75 (Black, J., dissenting). In support of his assertion that
there were "countries" where these objectionable procedures were permitted, Justice
Black cited Robert A. Vogeler & Leigh White, The Trap Closes: "I Was Stalin's
Prisoner," SATURDAY EVENING POST, Nov. 3, 1951, at 36, 36. The article discussed the
arrest and initial interrogation of Robert Vogeler, an American representative of IT&T,
at the hands of Hungarian officials in 1949. See id. The multi-part article included
extensive discussion of "third degree" interrogation techniques, including bright lights,
dunking in cold water, and sleep and food deprivation. See, e.g., Robert A. Vogeler &
Leigh White, Why I Confessed, SATURDAY EVENING POsT, Nov. 10, 1951, at 29, 29
(claiming that the author was subjected to 65 hours of interrogation and drugged by
Hungarian authorities); id. at 135-36 (claiming deprivation of food and sleep); id. at 136
(noting that the author could overhear the torture of others and had inadequate food and
sleep); id. at 137 (describing physical torture); see also Robert A. Vogeler & Leigh White,
My Day in Court, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Nov. 17, 1951, at 29,29 ("The Reds stood
Vogeler in a crowded courtroom, before microphones and cameras, diplomats and
newspapermen, to parrot his false confession."); id. at 184 (noting that Vogeler was
threatened with being crippled for life if he refused to answer questions at trial); id. at 186
("It was the classical game of communists everywhere: Heads I win, tails you lose.").
97. See, e.g., Closing Brief at 4, 7, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (No. 12)
(arguing that "secret police of totalitarian countries could do no more" than had been
done to invade the defendant's privacy and that "[w]e cannot complain of the acts of
spying, invasion of privacy, and ordered liberty in totalitarian countries, if we ... allow
the procedure used here to receive the approval of this court as our basic concept of
ordered liberty"); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952) (No. 543) (comparing "actions of the Government agents and employees in
this case" to activities "we hear as now occurring in those countries beyond the 'Iron
Curtain' "); id. (noting that the federal officers' activities "certainly do not conform to the
concepts within this Country of those 'certain inalienable rights' "with which "the second
paragraph of our Declaration of Independence informs the world all men are endowed").
98. Petition for Rehearing at 2, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (No. 543)
(comparing police conduct with widespread clandestine electronic surveillance in Russia
and arguing that "[t]he example of this case, insignificant in its effect upon the defendant,
will have world-wide repercussion as an example of American justice or injustice," and
that "[o]ur boast of our home inviolability is demonstrated in reverse").
99. This included some areas only peripherally related to criminal procedure, such as
the quasi-criminal area of deportation. In Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), for example,
the Court held it appropriate to deny suspension of deportation to a former member of
the Communist Party based on undisclosed confidential information. See id. at 360. The
dissent considered this an unacceptable parallel to the perceived excesses of the Soviet
legal system:
No amount of legal reasoning by the Court and no rationalization that can
be devised can disguise the fact that the use of anonymous information to banish
people is not consistent with the principles of a free country. Unfortunately
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police practices ought to be constitutionally acceptable.'
C. Contemporary Examples
Since the early Cold War period, totalitarian comparisons have
been used intermittently. But the more recent uses are less
consistent and less broadly adopted. Moreover, there is less tendency
toward a single, uniformly invoked negative example, in the way that
Nazi or Soviet comparisons dominated earlier references. 0' The
broader, less specific invocations of negative models may reflect the
absence of a single dominant, contemporary negative model with
sufficient currency and consensus to serve as a template for the
translation of constitutional values. Yet judges still ask the same
there are some who think that the way to save freedom in this country is to
adopt the techniques of tyranny. One technique which is always used to
maintain absolute power in totalitarian governments is the use of anonymous
information by government against those who are obnoxious to the rulers.
Id. at 367 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 369 n.12 (Black, J., dissenting) ("The
destruction of judicial protections for fair and open determinations of guilt is an essential
to maintenance of dictatorships.").
100. Perhaps the most intriguing example is Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
Abel, a KGB colonel convicted of espionage in New York in 1957, was "grilled
ceaselessly by the FBI for five days without sleep, and then daily for three weeks,"
Berman, supra note 73, at ii, but refused to confess to acting as a Soviet agent, see id. The
Supreme Court sustained admission of evidence against Abel seized during an INS search
of his belongings pursuant to an administrative arrest warrant. See Abel, 362 U.S. at 222.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion discussed the solitary interrogation of Abel. See id.
at 252 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan used totalitarian comparisons in
objecting to the defendant's treatment:
[Ihe Court's attitude here must be based on a recognition of the great
possibilities of abuse its decision leaves in the present situation. These
possibilities have been recognized before .... "Arrest under a warrant for a
minor or a trumped-up charge has been familiar practice in the past, is a
commonplace in the police state of today, and too well-known in this
country... . The progress is too easy from police action unscrutinized by judicial
authorization to the police state."
Id at 254 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Abel was ultimately exchanged in 1962 for Francis
Gary Powers, an American U-2 pilot convicted of espionage in the Soviet Union. See
Abel for Powers, TIME, Feb. 16, 1962, at 15, 15.
101. A court may even use a sequence of negative comparisons, suggesting, for
example, that a particular practice "reek[s] of the police state tactics known to exist in
Hitler's Germany, Communist China and the Soviet Union, and totalitarian South
Africa." People v. Jones, 545 N.E.2d 1332, 1350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (Pincham, J.,
dissenting); see also Thompson v. State, No. CV-95-7385, 1997 WL 723166, at *4 (Ala.
Civ. App. Nov. 21, 1997) (reversing a forfeiture of money found in the defendant's car
when he was arrested for driving under the influence of marijuana and commenting that
"unlike in Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Soviet Union, in the United States mere
suspicions of illegal activity cannot support the state's decision to confiscate an
individual's property").
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critical questions as in earlier eras: Can particular police practices
coexist with their vision of America?
Cases involving the constitutionality of suspicionless questioning
of bus passengers provide the strongest recent examples.'02 While the
practice was ultimately sustained by the Supreme Court in Florida v.
Bostick,103 judges in passionate opposition, from state trial courts all
the way to the Supreme Court, viewed these encounters as typical of
totalitarian societies.1 4 They argued that suspicionless encounters
102. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 785 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 921 F.2d
1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Excluding the fruits of a search arising out of a purportedly
"consensual" encounter with the defendant, a passenger on an intercity bus trip, the court
expressed alarm at the lengths to which the government would go to suppress the "drug
scourge." See id. at 791. The court noted that "[it seems rather incongruous at this point
in the world's history that we find totalitarian states becoming more like our free society
while we in this nation are taking on their former trappings of suppressed liberties and
freedoms." Id. at 788; see also id. at 787 n.3 (noting that the justices of the Florida
Supreme Court, "like myself, believe that there are limits beyond which a free society
cannot allow its police to go").
For comparable language in state cases, see Jones, 545 N.E.2d at 1350 (Pincham, J.,
dissenting). Jones held that a suspicionless stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
See id. at 1336. In a forty-page dissent, Justice Pincham complained that "[t]he police
tactics in the case at bar and their approval by the trial court and this court promote and
advance the despicable oppressions known to exist in totalitarian police states in which
cherished civil liberties are enjoyed by only the privileged and powerful few." Id. at 1337
(Pincham, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that police had no information regarding the
defendant or his companion but nonetheless "these American citizens, alighting from a
public conveyance, in a public place, were stopped, interrogated and required to produce
and present to law enforcement officers their identification and explain their itinerary to
them." Id. at 1349-50 (Pincham, J., dissenting). Justice Pincham objected that "[t]hese
police state tactics and inquisitions, of stopping and grilling two American citizens, and
requiring them to justify their travels to the officer," resembled the tactics of totalitarian
governments, "where citizens are prohibited from traveling except by police permission in
the form of police issued traveling passes." Id. at 1350 (Pincham, J., dissenting). He
noted that an officer had testified in the case that police do not pursue someone on a
suspicionless stop in the train station "IF THEIR PAPERS ARE IN ORDER," id. at
1359 (Pincham, J., dissenting), and drew a totalitarian comparison: "I additionally
parentheticaliy note traveling citizens in totalitarian nations are likewise permitted to
resume their travel when the Gestapo, Cheks, NKVD, MVD, OGPU and the KPG
similarly determine that, 'THEIR PAPERS ARE IN ORDER,'" id. (Pincham, J.,
dissenting).
103. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). The Court concluded that it was necessary to consider the
totality of the circumstances and remanded for a determination whether police had
"convey[ed] a message that compliance with their requests was required." Id. at 437. If
not, the encounter was voluntary and consensual and therefore implicated no Fourth
Amendment concerns. See id. at 439-40.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204, 209 n.7 (D.D.C. 1990). The
Felder court held that a suspicionless "stop" of a bus passenger constituted a Fourth
Amendment "seizure" and suppressed the fruits of that seizure. See id. at 209. "[T]he
police practice of boarding buses and randomly approaching passengers to question and
search them without any articulable suspicion" was, the court concluded, repugnant to the
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, and the Interstate Commerce Clause. Id. at 209. In
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"burden[ed] the experience of traveling by bus with a degree of
governmental interference to which, until now, our society has been
proudly unaccustomed."'" 5 Justice Marshall noted that such stops
were frighteningly reminiscent of despotic regimes:
"'"The evidence in this cause has evoked images of other
days, under other flags, when no man traveled his nation's
roads or railways without fear of unwarranted interruption
.... The spectre of American citizens being asked, by
badge-wielding police, for identification, travel papers-in
short a raison d'etre-is foreign to any fair reading of the
Constitution, and its guarantee of human liberties. This is
not Hitler's Berlin, nor Stalin's Moscow, nor is it white
supremacist South Africa." ' 106
a footnote, the court quoted Justice Douglas:
"Free movement by the citizen is of course as dangerous to a tyrant as free
expression of ideas or the right of assembly and it is therefore controlled in most
countries in the interests of security. That is why riding boxcars carries extreme
penalties in Communist lands. That is why the ticketing of people and the use of
identification papers are routine matters under totalitarian regimes, yet
abhorrent in the United States.... This freedom of movement is the very
essence of our free society setting us apart. Like the right of assembly and the
right of association, it makes all other rights meaningful."
Id. at 209 n.7 (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 519-20 (1964)
(Douglas, J., concurring)).
105. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 443 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153,
1158 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Florida v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347, 348-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (quoting trial court order))). This language enjoyed a long journey to Justice
Marshall's dissent. The words were first used by the trial court, were quoted by the
Florida District Court of Appeal in Florida v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347, 348-49 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987), and then quoted again by the Florida Supreme Court in Bostick v. State,
554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1989), rev'd, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), before Justice Marshall
recited them. The Florida Supreme Court had taken this view even further:
The intrusion upon privacy rights caused by the Broward County policy is too
great for a democracy to sustain. Without doubt the inherently transient nature
of drug courier activity presents difficult law enforcement problems. Roving
patrols, random sweeps, and arbitrary searches or seizures would go far to
eliminate such crime in this state. Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Communist
Cuba have demonstrated all too tellingly the effectiveness of such methods. Yet
we are not a state that subscribes to the notion that ends justify means. History
demonstrates that the adoption of repressive measures, even to eliminate a clear
evil, usually results only in repression more mindless and terrifying than the evil
that prompted them. Means have a disturbing tendency to become the end
result.
Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158-59 (Fla. 1989), rev'd, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); see also
Snider v. State, 501 So. 2d 609, 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (Glickstein, J., dissenting)
(objecting to court's sustaining bus search as consensual).
The reference to white supremacist South Africa reflected Justice Marshall's view
that so-called "suspicionless" encounters are based not on random criteria but at least in
part on the race of the individuals subjected to such searches. "[A]t least one officer who
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That the parties themselves cast the case in such terms is evident
from their submissions to the Court.1 7
One interesting exchange on this subject suggests the beginning
of a breakdown regarding the acceptability of the comparisons. 08 In
reversing two pre-Bostick holdings that suspicionless questioning of
bus passengers violated the Fourth Amendment, the District of
Columbia Circuit mocked the use of the comparisons, noting that the
judges in the district court had concluded that "[a] police officer who
questions and searches consenting passengers aboard a bus ...
commits a per se violation of the Constitution that is reminiscent of
abuses under George III, Hitler, and Stalin," 0 9 and accordingly had
suppressed the evidence seized in those searches. While another
routinely confronts interstate travelers candidly admitted that race is a factor influencing
his decision whom to approach.... Thus, the basis of the decision to single out particular
passengers during a suspicionless sweep is less likely to be inarticulable than
unspeakable." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 441 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Amici before the Court had, considerably earlier, invoked the comparison with South
Africa in addressing the use of informants. See Brief and Motion of American Civil
Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae at 6, Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (No.
29).
107. One party's brief suggested that:
The facts of this case strike a familiar chord with most Americans, not because
they have personally experienced this scenario, but precisely because they have
not. The image of police officers asking for their "papers," and subjecting them
to ad hoc inquiries, is one that we have been fortunate to regard as an abhorrent
creature of authoritarian regimes. These encounters are unreasonable, most
fundamentally, because they do not fit with most Americans' sense of how they
are supposed to be dealt with by their Government.
Brief of Respondent at 17-18, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (No. 89-1717). The
United States, as amicus curiae, felt the need to respond to the totalitarian comparisons
used by the court below, noting that, "[b]ecause law enforcement officers in this country
must respect an individual's right to be left alone, the 'police state' images invoked by the
Florida Supreme Court ... miss the mark." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 24-25, Bostick (No. 89-1717). Yet the amicus brief of Americans
for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., which had, according to respondents, filed 85
previous amicus briefs with the Court, all supporting the position of law enforcement, see
Brief of Respondent at 18 n.19, Bostick (No. 89-1717), actually urged affirmance of the
Florida Supreme Court's ruling suppressing the search, arguing that, while the drug
epidemic required law enforcement to seek expansion of search opportunities, "it is
equally important that any extension of the Fourth Amendment must proceed in ways
that protect our nation's citizens against the arbitrary and often abusive techniques
employed in totalitarian societies." Motion to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae of
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., in Qualified Support of Affirmance of
Petition Below at 9, Bostick (No. 89-1717).
108. While the comparisons did not always inspire agreement, the propriety of using
the comparisons and their pertinence to larger questions about the character of American
society had not been significantly challenged.
109. United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1990), rev'g 728 F. Supp.
784 (D.D.C. 1990), and United States v. Cothran, 729 F. Supp. 153 (D.D.C. 1990).
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judge later criticized the belittling tone of this opinion,"' the
suggestion by the court of appeals that references to the practices of
known tyrannies somehow overstepped the bounds of permissible or
appropriate argument marked an abrupt departure from the era
when these comparisons-hyperbole though they may have been-
were widely accepted by those of different ideologies.
Judges have addressed other police practices using these
arguments, again, in both Fourth' and Fourteenth Amendment"
2
110. Judge Oberdorfer noted:
I take the liberty of expressing my dismay at the Court of Appeals' disparaging
description of the District Court opinions in Cothran and Lewis .... In my view
the War on Drugs and the activities of the Metropolitan Police Department's
dedicated drug interdiction officers make timely and relevant reminders of the
Eighteenth Century origins of the Fourth Amendment and of more
contemporary events which evidence the vulnerability of the liberties it is
designed to protect. Disparagement of these reminders disserves the common
enterprise of federal courts.
United States v. Alexander, 755 F. Supp. 448, 453 (D.D.C. 1991) (denying motion to
suppress fruit of suspicionless stop), aff'd, 961 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
111. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 467 (1989). Riley held that aerial
observations by a police officer hovering in a helicopter 400 feet above a suspect's
greenhouse did not constitute a Fourth Amendment "search." See id. at 449-51. Justice
Brennan's dissent quoted extensively from a passage in George Orwell's 1984 involving
helicopter surveillance and then asked, "Who can read this passage without a shudder,
and without the instinctive reaction that it depicts life in some country other than ours?"
Id. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 85 (discussing Brennan's dissent and
reference to Orwell).
112. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 383 n.19 (1986) (addressing the use of
testimony compelled during psychiatric examination). The Allen Court upheld a
commitment under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act notwithstanding that the
defendant was ordered to submit to two psychiatric examinations and the resulting
psychiatric opinions were admitted at the subsequent commitment proceeding. See id. at
375. Allen protested that his statements had been elicited from him in violation of his
privilege against self-incrimination, see id. at 366, but the Court concluded that the
sexually dangerous person's proceeding was not criminal in nature and that therefore the
privilege did not apply, see id. at 368-69. In protesting the Court's holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination was inapplicable to the "sexually dangerous persons"
proceeding, Justice Stevens, in dissent, objected to the potential for tyranny inherent in
such a ruling. He noted the use of commitment in the Soviet Union:
In the Soviet Union, "[t]wo procedures are most commonly used to commit
individuals to mental hospitals against their will: the civil and the criminal....
The criminal procedure for compulsory confinement is applicable to those who
have been accused of a criminal offense, and whose mental health is called into
question.... Under this procedure the accused loses virtually all of his or her
procedural rights and is left only with the passive right to an honest psychiatric
examination and a fair court hearing."
Id. at 383 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Amnesty International, Political Abuse of
Psychiatry in the USSR, in Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and Intl Org.
of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Comm'n on Sec. and Cooperation in Europe,
98th Cong. 72-73 (1983)).
This equation of totalitarianism with misuse of the process of civil commitment was
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contexts. This comparative approach is also sometimes revisited as
state courts consider imposing higher state constitutional thresholds
in areas where a federal constitutional challenge will not lie. As state
courts consider constitutional limits on police authority, the character
of American society and its fundamental inconsistency with
totalitarian police practices remains meaningful.
114
invoked more recently in oral argument in Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hendricks, (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075), available in 1996
WL 721073. In addressing whether commitment for sexually violent predators was
constitutionally acceptable, one member of the Court noted that the state could avoid the
problem by imposing a life sentence for a first conviction of child molestation and asked
defense counsel why the state could not choose the "gentler and kinder" remedy of
treatment and potential release. See id. at *37. Justice Scalia commented, "[m]aybe the
State has to take the harsher course because the harsher course is the only one that is less
manipulable.... I mean, isn't there some fear about-you know, totalitarian regimes
don't put people in jail for crimes. They commit them for mental treatment." Id. at *38;
see also Arguments Heard, 60 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) at 3138, 3140 (Jan. 8, 1997)
(summarizing oral argument regarding alternatives to commitment).
113. Sometimes the recitation even includes past American practices. See, e.g.,
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 371 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is "the specific provision that
protects all citizens from the kind of custodial interrogation that was once employed by
the Star Chamber, by 'the Germans of the 1930's and early 1940's,' and by some of our
own police departments only a few decades ago" (footnotes omitted) (quoting Warren E.
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1964))).
114. For example, holding that warrantless electronic eavesdropping on a suspect by
use of a body bug worn by an undercover officer violated Article I, Section 12 of the
Florida Constitution, the Florida District Court of Appeal stated:
We are unwilling to impose upon our citizens the risk of assuming that the
uninvited ear of the state is an unseen and unknown listener to every private
conversation which they have in their homes. That is too much for d proud and
free people to tolerate without taking a long step down the totalitarian road....
No free society can long remain free which places such private conversations in
the home entirely beyond any constitutional protection.
Sarmiento v. State, 371 So. 2d 1047,1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), aff'd, 397 So. 2d 643
(Fla. 1981), superseded by state constitutional amendment as stated in State v. Ridenour,
453 So. 2d 193, 193-94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); see also Commonwealth v. Schaeffer,
536 A.2d 354, 376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that the use of a body wire on an
undercover informant to record and transmit a person's conversation in his house without
a warrant violated the Pennsylvania Constitution), overruled by Commonwealth v. Brion,
652 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 1994) (holding that the state constitution prohibits only
surreptitious warrantless recording of a person's conversations in his home). In Schaeffer,
the court noted: "The most apocalyptic vision of the practice of participant monitoring is
that, unconstrained by constitutional limitations, it threatens to become a police-state tool
of a type totally inconsistent with the free democratic traditions of the American people."
Schaeffer, 536 A.2d at 370; see also Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1034
(Mass. 1987) (prohibiting warrantless one-party consent monitoring of in-home
conversations pursuant to Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights); cf.
State v. Brooks, 601 A.2d 963, 970 (Vt. 1991) (Morse, J., dissenting) (noting that
"'widespread and unrestricted use of government informants is surely one of the basic
characteristics of a totalitarian state,'" and that warrantless electronic monitoring
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III. EXPLAINING THE PHENOMENON OF TOTALITARIAN
COMPARISON
Part II demonstrates that the courts invoked totalitarian
comparisons frequently in criminal procedure decisions during the
postwar and Cold War periods. It reflects, moreover, some tacit
agreement in the legal community that these concerns were relevant
to issues of constitutional limits on police authority. Lawyers
asserted them on behalf of their clients. Judges invoked them.
Scholars used them. Part II.C indicates that the practice continues,
though in a fractured and inconsistent fashion that may suggest a
fundamental shift in the way the concepts are taken into account.
These comparisons were probably not meant literally, in the
sense that their users genuinely viewed the conduct at issue, whatever
it was, as equivalent to totalitarian abuses. Individual instances of
police misconduct, however egregious, could not equate with such
heinous comparisons. Furthermore, while some of the cases may
have had their roots in persistent systemic biases, the comparisons
were not typically used to challenge those biases.
Nor was it seriously contended that the challenged practices
would lead directly to the development of American totalitarianism.
The police tactics may have represented stops along the pathway to
an undesired result, but no one contended seriously that these
practices amounted to Nazism.. Instead, the comparisons were
typically used to provide contrast with what the writer perceived as
the core principles of a free society. They functioned to define the
values their users thought were central to the American system.
That this is how the comparisons were used tells us little about
why they were used. The possibilities lie on a continuum of sorts. At
one extreme, it could be argued that the comparisons, or more
generally the existence of totalitarianism that gave rise to the
comparisons, were dispositive of the case outcomes in some sense-
that they drove the development of the law in this area and were,
consequently, reflected in the opinions of the time. At the other
extreme, the use of the comparisons could be almost meaningless-
the words were chosen, perhaps, because they would attract attention
or seemed contemporary, even though they were substantively
irrelevant. Along this spectrum lie many other possibilities
attributing differing degrees of substantive importance to the use of
the comparisons.
eliminates "two checks or controls provided by [the Vermont Constitution], probable
cause and judicial warrant" (quoting Brooks, 601 A.2d at 965)).
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While we cannot know for certain why the comparisons were
used in any particular case, we can reject certain general assumptions.
If, for example, the totalitarian model had been strictly outcome-
determinative, if it had caused an abrupt shift in criminal procedure
jurisprudence, we might have expected to see the anti-totalitarian
view prevailing more often. As noted above, however, totalitarian
comparison was used frequently in dissent. In many areas it took the
law years to arrive at the result initially suggested by the users of
totalitarian comparison, and in at least one category of cases-those
dealing with participant monitoring-it never did.
Before turning to the significance of totalitarian comparison to
the development of the law, we need to address some plausible, but
ultimately unsatisfying, explanations. First, it has been suggested that
totalitarian comparisons were used largely by Justice Jackson and
reflect his experience as a Nuremberg prosecutor. Part III.A.1
rejects this explanation."5 Second, the comparisons may be used to
justify to the public certain kinds of pro-defendant results. Part
III.A.2 argues that this is unlikely because the comparisons are used
widely both in dissents and in legal scholarship." 6 Third, one might
argue that the comparisons are purely rhetorical. Part III.A.3
suggests that concluding the comparisons have rhetorical value does
not address why they are compelling and adds little to our
understanding of the phenomenon."
7
A. Possible Rationales for Totalitarian Comparison
1. The Jackson Hypothesis
It has been suggested that, at least on the Supreme Court, the
use of totalitarian comparisons was a product of Justice Jackson's
service as Chief of Counsel at the first of the Nuremberg war crimes
trials."8 This theory suggests that by virtue of his experience, Jackson
115. See infra notes 118-45 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 162-76 and accompanying text.
118. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[P]articularly in the period immediately after World War II and particularly in opinions
authored by Justice Jackson after his service as a special prosecutor at the Nuremberg
trials-the Court has recognized the importance of [the warrant requirement] as a
bulwark against police practices that prevail in totalitarian regimes."); see also Steiker,
supra note 51, at 842-43 (discussing Jackson's role in criminal procedure cases after his
return from Nuremberg). Jackson took leave from the Court to lead the American
prosecution team at Nuremberg, serving as special prosecutor from May 2, 1945, to
October 7, 1946. See Justice Jackson's Final Report to the President Concerning the
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was uniquely positioned to comprehend the existence 9 and
significance 120 of Nazi abuses. Evidence of unfettered abuse of police
authority was apparent from the records of those prosecutions in
which Jackson served as Chief of Counsel, although they did not
emphasize criminal procedure. 2  Jackson's exposure to this
Nurnberg War Crimes Trial, 20 TEMP. L.Q. 338, 338 (1946-47) [hereinafter Final Report];
see also THE NORNBERG CASE at xiv-xviii (Robert H. Jackson ed., 1947) (containing
several documents concerning the Nuremberg trials).
119. Jackson later identified as one of his accomplishments "the historical
documentation of the development of totalitarian dictatorship in the Nazi era." Telford
Taylor, The Nuremberg Trials, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 488, 510 (1955). The documentation,
which was obtained from German sources, provided descriptions of "the Nazi aggressions,
persecutions, and atrocities with such authenticity and in such detail that there can be no
responsible denial of these crimes in the future." Final Report, supra note 118, at 343-44.
Jackson noted that:
[T]he Nazis themselves with Machiavellian shamelessness exposed their
methods of subverting people's liberties and establishing their dictatorships.
The record is a merciless expose of the cruel and sordid methods by which a
militant minority seized power, suppressed opposition, set up secret political
police and concentration camps. They resorted to legal devices such as
"protective custody," which Goering frankly said meant the arrest of people not
because they had committed any crime but because of acts it was suspected they
might commit if left at liberty. They destroyed all judicial remedies for the
citizen and all protections against terrorism. The record discloses the early
symptoms of dictatorship and shows that it is only in its incipient stages that it
can be brought under control.
Id. at 343-44.
120. The opinion that Jackson's perspective on "civil liberties" was altered by his time
at Nuremberg was contemporaneous as well. See Paul A. Freund, Individual and
Commonwealth in the Thought of Mr. Justice Jackson, 8 STAN. L. REV. 9, 17-19 (1955);
Louis L. Jaffe, Mr. Justice Jackson, 68 HARv. L. REV. 940, 982 (1955). Others have
posited less coherent bases for Jackson's decisions. One biographer noted that "[a]ll
judges, like all people, have idiosyncratic variations in their constellations of values; for
Jackson, one of the most conspicuous of these personal attitudinal biases seemed to be a
relatively soft spot for defendants who protested against allegedly illegal searches and
seizures." GLENDON SCHUBERT, DISPASSIONATE JUSTICE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE
JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF ROBERT H. JACKSON 107-08 (1969).
There is as yet no complete contemporary biography of Justice Jackson, and one is
"long overdue." See For Further Reading, 1 J. SUP. Or. HIST. 119 (1996).
121. For a summary of the evidence, see generally WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY
ON TRIAL: THE EVIDENCE AT NUREMBERG (1954). Harris discussed police abuses. See
id. at 436-42 (discussing use of torture in interrogation); id. at 53 (discussing protective
custody and deprivation of the right to counsel); id. at 54 (discussing monitoring of
individuals). Harris noted:
The [Nazis], operating furtively through a vast network of informants,
spied upon the German people in their daily lives, on the streets, in the shops,
and even within the sanctity of the churches. In this atmosphere of suspense and
terror the German citizen learned to pull down the blinds against the glances of
the passer-by, to listen to footsteps in the hall outside his door, and to speak in
whispers. His casual remark, repeated to the police, might lead to the call in the
night, the terror of Gestapo inquisition, and the horror of the concentration
camp. In the Nazi government, where the rule of law was replaced by a
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information was unparalleled on the Supreme Court. He is,
moreover, the source of some very potent totalitarian comparisons.122
While Jackson's pride in his Nuremberg role was evident"' and its
impact on him profound, 24 the notion that this form of argument
tyrannical rule of men, the Gestapo and the SD were primary instrumentalities
of oppression.
Id. at 54; see also id. at 45-47 (discussing the suppression of constitutional protections for,
inter alia, freedom of speech and the press and inviolability of the home). That Harris's
book reflected Jackson's view of the evidence is suggested by Jackson's introduction, in
which he noted that the prosecution's "record of forty-two volumes is too vast, detailed,
and disjointed for general study," and that the book was "a factual summary of the
evidence that is objective, accurate, and comprehensive." Robert H. Jackson,
Introduction to WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE EVIDENCE AT
NUREMBERG at xxix, xxx (1954).
122. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948); see also supra notes 52-53
and accompanying text (discussing Johnson); supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text
(discussing Brinegar).
123. Jackson himself later wrote: "IT]he hard months at Nuremberg were well spent
in the most important, enduring, and constructive work of my life." Jackson, supra note
121, at xxxvii. Nuremberg may have taken on even greater significance for Jackson in
light of the possibility that he felt it cost him an opportunity to become Chief Justice. See
Whitney North Seymour, Introduction to MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, FOUR LECTURES IN HIS
HONOR 1, 89 (1969). For discussions of Jackson's widely reported intemperate outburst
against Justice Black from Nuremberg after Fred M. Vinson was appointed to replace
Chief Justice Stone, see DOUGLAS, supra note 81, at 28-32, WESLEY MCCUNE, THE NINE
YOUNG MEN 165-70 (1947), and C. HERMAN PRrrCHETr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 26-
29 (1948).
124. This is reflected in Jackson's writing in other areas as well, most notably on the
First Amendment, where he demonstrated his impassioned concern about the way
National Socialism had risen in Germany and the importance of avoiding such a result
here. His experience made him deeply concerned with the dangers of inflammatory
speech:
There are many appeals these days to liberty, often by those who are
working for an opportunity to taunt democracy with its stupidity in furnishing
them the weapons to destroy it as did [Nazi Joseph] Goebbels when he said:
"When democracy granted democratic methods for us in the times of opposition,
this [Nazi seizure of power] was bound to happen ......
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 35 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting Goebbels); see
also Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its Limitations, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 2022, 2070 (1993) ("For Justice Jackson, one lesson of Nuremberg was
that rabble-rousing hatemongers could be dangerous-after all, Hitler and Streicher were
merely obscure street-corner speakers in the early 1920s-and so local officials might
prohibit or punish such speech consistent with the First Amendment."); id. at 2078 (noting
that Jackson's views toward communist conspirators "were shaped by the perceived
threat that determined organizations can pose to liberal democracies-in other words, by
the lesson he brought home from Nuremberg and from the fall of the Weimar Republic").
The Justice's experience affected him in other ways. One foreign diplomat observed:
"'My last memory of Bob is of lunching in his room at the Supreme Court with Felix
Frankfurter during the height of the McCarthy horror. There were the four flags from the
Nuremberg Court room behind Bob's desk with the Hammer and Sickle of the Soviet flag
unashamedly exposed.'" Lord Shawcross, Lecture 4, in MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, FOUR
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derived solely from him is unconvincing. While Jackson used
totalitarian comparisons, other Justices did as well,"2 including,
among others, Justices Black,2 6 Douglas,127 Frankfurter,' and
Murphy,2 9 who were his contemporaries, as well as later Justices
Brennan, 30 Fortas,' Marshall, 32 and Stevens. 133 The comparisons
were used, at least in isolated instances, before Justice Jackson
departed for Nuremberg" and persisted after Jackson's relatively
short tenure on the Court.35
LECruRES IN His HONOR 136 (quoting a letter from the then-Attorney General of
England).
125. I attribute the opinions to the Justices notwithstanding the role that law clerks
may have played in the preparation of some opinions. "To recognize that law clerks
frequently draft opinions seems to me to prove little, for the ultimate responsibility is that
of the Justices, not of the law clerks." Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court
Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 23 (1979).
126. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944); see also supra notes 65-
68 and accompanying text (discussing Ashcraft). While Justice Black conceded that the
provisions of the Bill of Rights "were designed to meet ancient evils," he also noted that
"they are the same kind of human evils that have emerged from century to century
wherever excessive power is sought by the few at the expense of the many." Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Black refused to
"consider the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th Century 'strait jacket.' " Id. (Black, J.,
dissenting).
127. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 67-68 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring);
see also supra text accompanying note 78 (quoting Justice Douglas's concurrence in
Berger).
128. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); see also supra text accompanying
note 56 (quoting Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf); supra note 81 (discussing Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954)).
129. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 146, 194 (1947) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 433 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 58 (discussing Justice Murphy's dissent in Harris); supra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Murphy's dissent in Malinski).
130. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 448 U.S. 445,466 (1989); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
61-62 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); see also supra note 85 (discussing Justice
Brennan's dissent in Riley); supra note 71 (discussing Justice Brennan's opinion in Ker).
131. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 202 (1969) (Fortas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional scheme that government, like the individual, is bound by the law. We do
not subscribe to the totalitarian principle that the Government is the law, or that it may
disregard the law even in pursuit of the lawbreaker.").
132 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 442 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
also supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Marshall's dissent in
Bostick).
133. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 383 n.19 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 371 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes
112-13 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's dissents in Allen and Elstad).
134. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944); see also supra notes 65-
68 and accompanying text (discussing Ashcraft). As noted supra in note 118, Jackson did
not go to Nuremberg until 1945; Ashcraft was decided in 1944.
135. Justice Jackson served from 1941 to 1954. See EUGENE C. GERHART, LAWYER'S
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Moreover, Jackson's use of totalitarian arguments seems in large
part to support and reflect his pre-Nuremberg views. Jackson used
the comparisons persuasively in at least one Fourth Amendment case
involving a home invasion.136 Yet Jackson's hostility to home
invasions and his sympathy to Fourth Amendment claims could have
been anticipated before Nuremberg. 137 On the other hand, Jackson
JUDGE 21 (1961). While analogies to Nazi abuses were no longer prevalent by 1954,
arguments warning of the dangers of totalitarian excess and references to the Soviet
Union continued well beyond that time. See supra Parts II.B and II.C.
136. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). Johnson actually involved
the invasion of a hotel room, but Jackson treated it as a home invasion, referring to the
room as "defendant's living quarters," id. at 13, and noting that "[t]he right of officers to
thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a
society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance," id.
at 14.
137. It is hard to tell much about Jackson's pre-Nuremberg views of the Fourth
Amendment from his early record on the Supreme Court, because Jackson seems to have
recused himself from Fourth Amendment cases early in his tenure. See, e.g., Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 136 (1942), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). Jackson recused himself in Goldman because, as Attorney
General, a position Jackson held from January 4, 1940 until his appointment to the Court
in 1941, the prosecution was conducted under his authority. See HOWARD, supra note 43,
at 283.
However, an incident reflected in Jackson's confirmation hearings suggests his pre-
Nuremberg view of home invasions. During his tenure as Attorney General, he
recommended dismissal of indictments pending against a number of defendants charged
with conspiring to induce Americans to enlist in the Spanish Civil War. See Nomination
of Robert H. Jackson to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 9-16 (1941) (statement of
Sen. Norris). Evidence leading to the indictments was alleged to have been obtained
through improper search tactics. See id. At Jackson's confirmation hearing, a witness,
whose son had fought and died in the Spanish Civil War, testified with outrage to
Jackson's ordering the dismissal of the indictments. See id. at 1-9. Senator Norris
intervened to indicate that the case involved defendants-evidently middle-class
professionals-whose "rights as citizens of the United States were violated in the manner
of their arrest." Id. at 10. He described the circumstances of the arrest of one, a doctor
and former president of the State Medical Association:
About 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning the telephone rang, and his wife got
up out of bed-she was in bed sleeping with her husband, the doctor-and
answered the phone. She was told over the phone by someone down at the
entrance to the apartment house that they had a man that was either crippled or
sick or wounded in some way,... and they needed medical assistance ....
She told them to come up, and that was the way they got into the
apartment. The doctor hadn't yet gotten up, he was in bed. They arrested him
and handcuffed him while he was in bed. They went through the room, opened
all the dresser drawers, examined their clothing, and wouldn't permit them to go
to the telephone to call up and get legal advice.
... They tore up their apartment....
... It was a barbarous treatment, it seems to me.
I didn't care whether they were Communists, or what they were, there
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appears to have found claims of psychologically coerced confessions
equally unpersuasive 38 before and after Nuremberg.' 39  In 1944,
was no reason why anybody should be treated, it seemed to me, the way they
were treated.
Now, Attorney General Jackson, who was then in office, after I had
investigated these affidavits I communicated with him and told him that in my
judgment the treatment of these people was inhuman, the methods used were
un-American, and that it was a denial of the constitutional rights that every
citizen had, regardless of what the charge was, and that there was no cause for
the treatment that those people had been accorded.
Afterwards the Attorney General, then Mr. Jackson, dismissed all those
indictments.
Id. at 10-11.
138. But see Bush, supra note 124, at 2053 (noting that in the criminal procedure area,
Jackson "seemed to leapfrog to the left, and his approach to certain Fourth Amendment
and federal due process issues represents perhaps the flood tide of Supreme Court
liberalism in that area"). Given Jackson's ongoing rejection of the notion that admission
of a confession produced as the result of psychological coercion could violate the Due
Process Clause, see infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text, I reject Professor Bush's
wholesale characterization of Jackson's criminal procedure record as overwhelmingly
"liberal."
139. The apparent inconsistency between Jackson's positions on the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments was noted contemporaneously. See Jaffe, supra note 120, at
977-81. Professor Jaffe noted that Jackson was "in the forefront of those who would give
the most thoroughgoing effect to the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure. Yet he has been the boldest and most vigorous opponent of federal
review of confessions in state trials." Id. at 977 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 977-78
("Jackson sees Everyman at the wheel of Brinegar's car but not in the little room in the
police station where Watts sits, under floodlights, undergoing his agony."). Professor
Jaffe argued that Jackson believed a search was more likely than a coerced confession to
be the product of central government regulation, see id. at 978, and that the Justice was
logically unable to draw a line between permissible and impermissible coercion, making
his position the product of "intellectual distress," id. at 979-80. Jaffe also posited that
Justice Jackson did not believe that forced interrogation increased the sum total of
lawlessness and brutality in society, and that "Jackson thus identified Everyman with the
victim of the unreasonable search and seizure," but did "not identify Everyman with the
usual third-degree victim." Id. at 980. Jaffe concluded: "There is, I think, little doubt
that he was not in sympathy with the progressive refinement of rules protecting criminal
defendants. He probably believed that the Court was making a fetish of procedural
protection at the expense of law enforcement." Id. at 981 (footnote omitted); see also
Freund, supra note 120, at 22 (noting that "[i]t would be an overstatement to say that the
Justice was concerned with procedure in all its aspects" and observing that in state court
criminal cases, "he tended to focus on the reliability of the evidence and not on the
procedures by which it was obtained" (footnote omitted)).
One author suggested that Jackson's views depended on the severity of the crime
charged. See Charles Fairman, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 55 COLUM. L.
REv. 445, 470 (1955). Fairman argues that Justice Jackson's statement in Brinegar to the
effect that judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment should "'depend somewhat
upon the gravity of the offense,' "is "the key to understanding Justice Jackson's record in
the 'third-degree' cases, where, notably, he tolerated serious invasions of rights as a
means to solving crimes of violence." Id. at 470 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). In support of this view, see Watts v.
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before his stint at Nuremberg, Jackson dissented strongly in Ashcraft
v. Tennessee.140  In Ashcraft, the defendant sought to suppress a
confession given after thirty-six hours of continuous questioning;
there it was the majority-not Justice Jackson-that used totalitarian
comparisons in suppressing the confession. 4' Justice Jackson also
found the claims in Malinski v. New York 42 unconvincing, voting to
affirm the defendant's murder conviction, 43 notwithstanding that
during five days of pre-arraignment detention, Malinski had been
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), in which Jackson noted that American protections for
criminal defendants "represent the maximum restrictions upon the power of organized
society over the individual that are compatible with the maintenance of organized society
itself," but that, in light of the severity of the crime at issue (murder) and the limits the
protections impose on society's power to solve crimes, we should not indulge in any
"unnecessary expansion" of them. IL at 61 (Jackson, J., concurring in the result). This
approach has been noted recently; Professor Akhil Amar deemed it an example of
"common-sense reasonableness." Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 801-02 (1994).
140. 322 U.S. 143, 156-74 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also supra text
accompanying notes 65-68 (discussing Ashcraft).
141. See Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 155; see also supra text accompanying note 67 (quoting
Ashcraft). Justice Jackson's opinion rejected the comparison:
This questioning is characterized as a "secret inquisition," invoking all of the
horrendous historical associations of those words. Certainly the inquiry was
participated in by a good many persons, and we do not see how it could have
been much less "secret" unless the press should have been called in. Of course,
any questioning may be characterized as an "inquisition," but the use of such
characterizations is no substitute for the detached and judicial consideration that
the court below gave to the case.
Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 168 (Jackson, J., dissenting). He then went on:
At what point in all this investigation does the Court hold that the
Constitution commands these officers to send Ashcraft on his way and give up
the murder as insoluble? If the State is denied the right to apply any pressure to
him which is "inherently coercive" it could hardly deprive him of his freedom at
all. I, too, dislike to think of any man, under the disadvantages and indignities of
detention being questioned about his personal life for thirty-six hours or for one
hour. In fact, there is much in our whole system of penology that seems archaic
and vindictive and badly managed. Every person in the community, no matter
how inconvenient or embarrassing, no matter what retaliation it exposes him to,
may be called upon to take the witness stand and tell all he knows about a
crime-except the person who knows most about it. Efforts of prosecutors to
compensate for this handicap by violent or brutal treatment or threats we
condemn as passionately and sincerely as other members of the Court. But we
are not ready to say that the pressure to disclose crime, involved in decent
detention and lengthy examination, although we admit them to be "inherently
coercive," are denied to a State by the Constitution, where they are not proved
to have passed the individual's ability to resist and to admit, deny, or refuse to
answer.
Id. at 169-70 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
142. 324 U.S. 401 (1945); see also supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text (discussing
Malinski).
143. See Malinski, 324 U.S. at 434.
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stripped naked and subjected to intentional humiliation and fear of a
beating to persuade him to confess.1" After Nuremberg, Jackson was
similarly unmoved by claims of psychological coercion induced by
excessive detention. 45 Jackson's limited and category-specific use of
totalitarian comparisons in criminal procedure cases, and the breadth
and timing of their use by others, suggest that the comparisons
cannot be attributed solely to him.
2. Public Justification
One possible perspective is that totalitarian comparisons were
offered to justify to a sometimes skeptical public the constitutional
limitations on police authority. Imagine that you are a judge in the
postwar period preparing an opinion upholding the suppression of
otherwise probative evidence because of a Fourth Amendment
violation. 46 The violation is egregious and, to you, somewhat
alarming. Yet the crime was also alarming, and you anticipate the
public will be hostile towards a decision that will cause the dismissal
of an otherwise valid criminal prosecution against an admittedly
guilty suspect. You, yourself, may find this aspect of the case
troubling.
This problem reflects a broader contextual concern. The
constitutional protections were motivated by a profound suspicion of
government authority 47 that the public may no longer feel. The
144. See id. at 421 n.1 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part).
145. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 69-71 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). The Court held that detaining Gallegos, a Mexican migrant worker who
spoke no English, for a total of 25 days without arraignment on suspicion of homicide did
not violate the then-prevailing due process standard applied to the states. See id. at 56-68.
Justice Jackson, writing separately in concurrence, concluded that because the lengthy
detention followed a confession made by the defendant, the detention could not have
been intended to coerce a confession, see id. at 69 (Jackson, J., concurring), and that an
earlier confession, given in Texas, was not the product of coercion because the only
threats made to Gallegos-that he might be turned over to the Mexican authorities-
were true, see id. at 70-71 (Jackson, J., concurring). Use of totalitarian comparisons to
argue that admission of these confessions violated the Constitution was made in this case,
but not by Justice Jackson. See id. at 73-75 (Black, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 94-
96 and accompanying text (discussing Black's dissent). In the words of one commentator,
"Jackson saw no abridgement of the Fourteenth Amendment in practices whereby the
police subjected suspects to the third degree, with varying degrees of sophistication short
of direct physical torture and literally beating a confession out of a suspect-and not
necessarily even then." SCHUBERT, supra note 120, at 130 (footnote omitted).
146. This hypothetical assumes a violation by a federal official, which would have
required suppression even in the pre-incorporation era. The hypothetical could be
fashioned to set forth a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination as well.
147. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
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power of the American "state" as an entity may be viewed by a
substantial sector of the public as largely benevolent,' making it
more difficult to argue convincingly for the need to limit police
authority. As a judge, you thus face an uphill battle in struggling to
put the opinion in terms that will persuade a public, concerned more
about the concrete benefits of crime prevention than the theoretical
values of constitutional liberty, of the importance of the underlying
constitutional values.
One option would be to set the opinion in historical context.
The tyranny of eighteenth-century English or colonial rule is plainly a
plausible benchmark against which police conduct ought to be
judged. First, these were the Framers' acknowledged contexts for
developing the Fourth Amendment. 49 Second, there is a track record
to follow; judges have regularly contrasted American procedural
protections with the historical examples upon which the Amendment
REV. 349,400 (1974). This has been called "our deeply rooted national skepticism toward
police and indeed all public authority." Burger, supra note 113, at 4.
148. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 296 (1993). Friedman wrote:
Of course, the revolutionary generation, when they thought about the "state,"
thought about George III, a tyrant from their point of view, and his autocratic
government in Westminster. They wanted at all costs to avoid something similar
here at home. In the twentieth century, George III was a distant and
unimportant memory .... The focus of attention had shifted. Government was
not the enemy, at least not in this area of life; the enemy was the bad people, the
criminals, the "dangerous classes."
Id. Similarly, Professor Amsterdam has noted:
[The framers appreciated the need for a powerful central government. But they
also feared what a powerful central government might bring, not only to the
jeopardy of the states but to the terror of the individual. When I myself look
back into that variegated political landscape which no observer can avoid
suffusing with the color of his own concerns, the hues that gleam most keenly to
my eye are the hues of an intense sense of danger of oppression of the
individual.
I find that sense of danger all the more striking because so many of us in
this country today have lost it. It is largely left to "those accused of crime" and
to the dwellers of the ghettos and the barrios of this land to view the policeman
as "an occupying soldier in a bitterly hostile country." For the rest of us, the
image of the policeman is the friendly face of the school crossing guard. From
childhood we are reared to see government and law and law enforcement as
benign. They pose no threat to us. But the authors of the Bill of Rights had
known oppressive government. I believe they meant to erect every safeguard
against it.
Amsterdam, supra note 147, at 400 (footnotes omitted).
149. There is little disagreement that the source of the Fourth Amendment was three
cases: Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep.
489 (K.B. 1763), and the Boston Writs of Assistance Case, see Stuntz, supra note 51, at
404-09. There is, however, some difference of opinion about the relative importance of
these three cases. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
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was based.50 This approach must be acceptable, for generations of
judges have already used it.
151
150. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-32 (1886). The Court in Boyd
combined discussions of the English precedents and the writs of assistance, making it hard
to separate out their distinct influences. The Court first discussed the writs of assistance.
See id. at 625. Then the Court noted: "[T]he events which took place in England
immediately following the argument about writs of assistance in Boston were fresh in the
memories of those who achieved our independence and established our form of
government." Id. at 625. The Court discussed Wilkes and Entick at length, concluding:
Can we doubt that when the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were penned and
adopted, the language of Lord Camden was relied on as expressing the true
doctrine on the subject of searches and seizures .... The struggles against
arbitrary power in which they had been engaged for more than twenty years,
would have been too deeply engraved in their memories to allow them to
approve of such insidious disguises of the old grievance which they had so deeply
abhorred.
And any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or
compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of
crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of a free
government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to
the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power; but it
cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom.
Id. at 630-32. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court stated:
[The Fourth Amendment] took its origin in the determination of the framers of
the Amendments to the Federal Constitution to provide for that instrument a
Bill of Rights, securing to the American people, among other things, those
safeguards which had grown up in England to protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, such as were permitted under the general
warrants issued under authority of the Government by which there had been
invasions of the home and privacy of the citizens and the seizure of their private
papers in support of charges, real or imaginary, made against them. Such
practices had also received sanction under warrants and seizures under the so-
called writs of assistance, issued in the American colonies.
Id. at 390; see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 137 (1942) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (citing Entick in discussion of importance of Fourth Amendment), overruled
in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (citing Entick), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-
53 (1967).
151. For contemporary examples, see the following: United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264-68 (1990); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596
(1989); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 362-63 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 245 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1980); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1978);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1977); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-84
(1965); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454-56 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 208-09 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), overruled by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 665 (1978); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-66 (1959), overruled in part by
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,528 (1967); and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 69-70 (1950) (Frankfurter, I., dissenting), overruled in part by Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752,768 (1969).
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There is only one problem with relying on the historical
examples. While these historical events may have been well-known
and significant to the Framers and the citizenry of their time,52 the
public in the present day is unlikely to know or care much about
eighteenth-century history and its role in developing the Framers'
fear of centralized police authority. Ancient, unfamiliar concerns
about customs searches or pamphleteers will seem foreign to anyone
still reading after the first paragraph. The opinion will seem remote,
dispassionate, and static; no sense of currency, immediacy, or drama
will make it convincing to the public audience.
But if you believe that most Americans share a common
abhorrence of Nazism or (depending on the era in which you write)
dislike and distrust for the Soviet Union, that may provide an
alternative approach. Members of the public may not know or care
whether they want their society to be like colonial America, but they
know they don't want it to resemble Nazi Germany. Consequently, a
court might use these arguments to justify strict constitutional
limitations on police authority in a way that a skeptical public might
not appreciate otherwise. Such an instrumental approach might not
have been used to derive constitutional norms but simply to sell
them, providing a high-minded, principled basis to persuade the
public that these protections, however troubling in microcosm, were
essential to maintain America's position as a uniquely free society.
This thesis may certainly have been operative in some cases. 3
This may, however, be an unduly narrow way to view the use of the
comparisons. First, the comparisons were not used exclusively-or
even primarily-to support outcomes in favor of defendants. As Part
II discusses, they were used perhaps more frequently in dissenting
152. See infra note 200 (collecting authorities establishing the familiarity the colonial
public had with these events).
153. For a contemporary example, see People v. Davis, 460 N.Y.S.2d 260 (N.Y. J. Ct.
1983). A local judge released on his own recognizance a burglary suspect who had been
detained for more than the statutorily permitted 72 hours without being allowed a
hearing. See id. at 261-62. The suspect later failed to appear, and the press criticized the
judge for releasing him. See id. at 262. Evidently feeling the need to respond, the judge
wrote an opinion justifying his release of the suspect. The judge fell back on passionate
invocation of the values of American society, arguing that "the lifeblood of individual
rights is found in the procedure available to effectuate these rights. Substantial
compliance with procedural rights is necessary to prevent a society from sliding into the
darkness of totalitarianism. Police power rightfully exercised protects the public. Police
power wrongfully used is the dictator's weapon." Id. The opinion then explained the
more mundane statutory basis for the defendant's release. See id. at 263-64. Finally, the
judge wrote: "Holding a prisoner incommunicado for seven days is something that simply
should not happen in a democratic society." Id- at 264.
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opposition to rulings sustaining government action against
constitutional challenge. 4  This was the case even if the long-term
development of the law was, ultimately, more consistent with the
arguments in which the comparisons were employed than the short-
term outcomes suggested. The arguments are political, certainly, but
they are not necessarily invoked to help the public swallow the bitter
pill of constitutionalism more easily.
This approach also suggests an unnecessarily narrow view of
opinion writing. It presumes that judges write opinions for the public
and fashion those opinions with an eye towards how the public will
perceive their decisions. This underlying assumption is open to some
question. While opinions handing down particular decisions that will
have substantial political impact may be conceived as exercises not
only in jurisprudence, but in public relations,155 judicial opinions are
not directed exclusively towards the public. Most scholars suggest
that judges write for themselves, or their colleagues, or the broader
legal community, rather than solely for the public audience. 6 This is
154. See supra notes 57-60, 92-96 and accompanying text.
155. Certainly the literature regarding the fashioning of the opinion in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), suggests that the opinion was prepared with a focus on
how it would be understood by the public. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF
97 (1983) (revealing that Chief Justice Warren thought that the opinion should be
"written in understandable English and avoid legalisms" because he "said he wanted an
opinion that could be understood by the layman"); see also id. ("The draft ... was
'prepared on the theory that the opinions should be short, readable by the lay public, non-
rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, nonaccusatory.'" (quoting Memorandum from
Chief Justice Earl Warren to the United States Supreme Court (May 7, 1954))).
156. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and
Constitutional Justice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611, 1622 (1997) ("I think that courts write
more to persuade themselves, and other lawyers, than they do to reassure citizens; judges
need most of all to convince themselves and their colleagues that they have the authority
and the responsibility to stand up for what they believe is right."); see also THOMAS B.
MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS 110-11 (1978) (noting that half of the
judges surveyed said they do not care, when writing opinions, about impressing anyone
but themselves, and that they consider their most important audience to be their
colleagues). Surely the current trend in Supreme Court opinions supports this argument.
For an example of an important decision in the form of a lengthy and complex exegesis
not written with an eye towards public comprehension or acceptance, see Printz v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
For a different view, see WILLIAM DOmNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 88
(1996). Domnarski asserts, without support, that "the [judicial] opinion, when used
effectively, is a vehicle of communication between the Court and the people. In other
words, the Justices see the people as their audience." Id. Domnarski identifies a "canon"
of Supreme Court decisions (including, among others, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954)) and argues that, at least with regard to these decisions, "the Justices are
writing not just for the litigants but for all those who are to be affected by the rights and
principles they are resolving and declaring. They are writing for the People writ large and
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a generalization, and one might expect criminal procedure to be one
area where the political rhetoric of judicial decisionmaking would
spill over substantially into the public arena, involving as the cases do
the rights of the individual as against the government, in situations
familiar and readily comprehensible to lay persons. Yet newspaper
coverage of the cases involving totalitarian comparison do not seem
to suggest any greater focus on these cases than others. While the
coverage sometimes includes salient quotes from the cases, 7 it would
be hard to argue that they are treated differently than other
categories of cases.'58
This is not to say that judicial opinions are not quintessentially
political. They are. Moreover, the political character of the courts'
disposition of criminal procedure matters is self-evident. The
question is whether judges use the language in opinions purely as a
means of convincing the public or whether they use the language as
part of a more complex process of convincing colleagues, the legal
community, the parties, and even themselves of the justice and
propriety of the result.
If, moreover, these arguments were directed primarily at
creating broad popular understanding and acceptance of
constitutional restrictions on police authority, one might not expect
they adopt strategies to reach them." Id. at 89. Even Domnarski does not suggest that
this is universally true of Supreme Court opinions.
157. See, e.g., Restriction on Searches Tightened, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1948, at 12
(discussing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), and quoting Justice Jackson's
majority opinion, which stated that "[a]ny other ruling ... would wipe out one of the big
differences between our Government, 'where officers are under the law, and the police
state, where they are the law' " (quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 17)); Lewis Wood, Search Is
Allowed Under Arrest Writ, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1947, at 1 (reporting decision in Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) and quoting Justice Murphy's dissent: "'The principle
established by the Court today can be used ... easily by some future government
determined to suppress political opposition under the guise of sedition'" (quoting Harris,
331 U.S. at 194 (Murphy, J., dissenting))). In Crime Hides Principle, WASH. POST, May 7,
1947, at 12, an editorial on Harris v. United States, the author noted: "Protection of the
individual's right to be secure in his home is a greater light in our democratic galaxy than
freedom of the police in bringing criminals to justice." Id.
158. The totalitarian comparison cases do not appear to get more press attention than
other cases. See, e.g., John P. MacKenzie, High Court Eases Curb on Bugging, WASH.
POST, Apr. 6, 1971, at Al (article on United States v. White, 401 U.S. 747 (1971),
appearing next to an article about Rogers v. Belle!, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), and leading off
article about numerous court decisions); Restriction on Searches Tightened, supra note
157, at 12 (single-column article about Johnson v. United States appearing next to a
lengthier article about Supreme Court's decision in Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan,
333 U.S. 28 (1948)); see also A Summary of Supreme Court Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
1971, at 28 (list of Supreme Court decisions including White appearing on the same page
as a full article about Bellei).
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to see them used extensively in legal scholarship, which has rarely
been accessible or compelling to popular readers. While at least
some judicial opinions are channeled through the press into popular
understanding, legal scholarship rarely has been, and is more
properly viewed as "insider" discourse.159  Yet totalitarian
comparisons are evident in legal scholarship1 60 as well as judicial
opinions, though some of the scholarship, delivered in public lectures,
may have had an impact on the public as well. 161 A theory that courts
159. One notable exception is the recent press treatment of the development of critical
race theory. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, One Angry Man, WASH. POST, May 30, 1997, at B1;
Neil A. Lewis, For Black Scholars Wedded to Prism of Race, New and Separate Goals,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at B9; Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, NEW REPUBLIC,
Dec. 9, 1996, at 27. This is, I would argue, the exception that proves the rule; it is critical
race theory's rejection of traditional legal scholarship that makes it newsworthy, while its
methodology may make it more interesting and accessible to a mainstream audience than
more traditional scholarship.
160. For later scholarly sources, see generally Geoffrey R. Stone, The Scope of the
Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers,
1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1193. Stone notes the importance of restraint in the use of
"spies and informers .... For in the absence of restraint, the practice could all too easily
jeopardize the very foundation of personal privacy and security upon which a free society
must ultimately rest." Id. at 1195. A footnote refers readers to sources "[flor
descriptions of the use of secret agents and informers in Nazi Germany and Stalinist
Russia." Id. at 1195 n.3.
161. For example, in an article originally delivered as part of a series of public lectures
at the University of Chicago Law School, Professor Jerome Hall drew a comparison
between police in America and police in totalitarian regimes. See Jerome Hall, Police
and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133,133 n.* (1953). Professor Hall wrote:
If we wish to understand and improve police service, we must first recognize that
the limitations and abuses in law enforcement which alarm and challenge us are
neither novel nor peculiarly American....
... Only a decade ago millions of defenseless human beings were
murdered by the German police in a calculated revival of all the diabolical
instruments of torture that twisted ingenuity has contrived. Far exceeding even
these abominations are the scientific tortures and enslavement of literally
millions of human beings by the NKVD in Russia and Siberia, beside which the
limitation of civil liberties in democratic states pales into insignificance.
Id. at 133. Hall further notes:
At no time in history has it been easier to compare the police of
democratic societies with that of dictatorships. The fascist dictatorships of Italy
and Germany are fresh in our memory and the Iron Curtain cannot conceal the
ugly facts of Communist tyranny. The refugees from these countries, bearing
the horrible scars of police violence, are living witnesses of the character of the
dictator's police. The concentration camps operated by the Gestapo achieved
systematic proficiency in the degradation of the human spirit. It does not
require any eloquence to portray Gestapo and NKVD torture of human beings
in a way that would revolt any decent person and persuade him that there is no
limit to the depravity to which human nature is capable of descending.
However, it is a startling fact that there is hardly a single physical
brutality inflicted by the Gestapo and the NKVD which American policemen
have not at some time perpetrated. Certainly the torture of Negroes by the
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used the comparisons to justify pro-defendant holdings to the public
thus cannot tell the whole story.
3. "Mere" Rhetoric
Another approach might be to view totalitarian comparisons as a
rhetorical device, an attempt to align a disliked result with the most
loathsome possible association. This would explain the movement
from the Nazi comparison to the Soviet comparison rather handily:
as another regime became the "bad guy," its abhorrence became the
negative example to which all that was abhorrent could best be
compared.
Certainly the comparisons are used to strong rhetorical
advantage. They suggest to complacent readers that techniques of
law enforcement, seemingly of little concern to law-abiding citizens,
contain in them the seeds of tyranny. More than that, they are
poetry. Justice Jackson's argument that uncontrolled search and
seizure is "effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the
individual and putting terror in every heart,"'162 is intensely evocative.
Justice Black's description of governments with the power to "seize
persons suspected of crimes against the state, hold them in secret
custody, and wring from them confessions by physical or mental
torture," and his majestic assertion that, "[s]o long as the
Constitution remains the basic law of our Republic, America will not
have that kind of government, ' 163 seem accompanied by a fanfare of
trumpets. A resounding validation of American values inheres in the
frightening invocation of the possible alternatives and the proud
assurance that the Constitution simply will not permit these abuses.
police in some communities rivals the barbarism of the Gestapo and NKVD....
It is, of course, true that the brutality of American police falls short of the
calculated barbarism of the secret police of modem dictators, and that it is
relatively infrequent. But these are matters of degree.
Id. at 139-40 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, Professor Amsterdam used totalitarian
comparison in an article, writing:
I have no doubt a court should say that any type of surveillance which can be
averted only by this drastic discipline, characteristic of life under totalitarian
regimes, is altogether too destructive of privacy and of the "right of the people
to be secure in their persons [and] ... houses" to escape the fourth amendment's
regulation.
Amsterdam, supra note 147, at 403 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). While Professor
Amsterdam's article was delivered initially as a public lecture at the University of
Minnesota Law School, the lengthy and technical exegesis of the Fourth Amendment was
plainly intended not for the lay public, but for an audience of lawyers, academics, and
students.
162. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
163. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944).
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To deny that these arguments served a rhetorical function would be
impossible."6
This explanation might also suggest why the comparisons are less
pointed and more subtle in cases in which there was substantial
agreement. Take, for example, Rochin v. California,165 the classic
"shocks the conscience" case. Surprised in his room by the police,
Rochin grabbed two capsules lying on a nightstand and swallowed
them. 66 Police took Rochin to the hospital and directed a physician
to force an emetic solution into his stomach to induce vomiting. 67
Rochin vomited up the capsules, which were seized and found to
contain morphine.16 The government charged him with possession of
that morphine and used the evidence forcibly seized from his
stomach against him. 69
These facts (including the enlistment of the medical profession
to assist the police in invading the physical integrity of the suspect)
would have permitted the most blatant totalitarian comparison.?
The author of the majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter, was familiar
with the comparisons, having used them in other contexts .71 He did
draw comparisons, but subtly. Justice Frankfurter noted simply that
"to sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was
condemned by the court whose judgment is before us, would be to
afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more calculated
to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a society.
1 72
To readers in 1951, "brutalizing the temper of a society" must have
164. One scholar of Justice Jackson has suggested that much of Jackson's writing
should be understood primarily as rhetoric. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Justice Jackson
and the Nuremberg Trials, 1 J. SUP. Cr. HIST. 105,113 (1996). Hutchinson notes:
There is a danger ... in overreading Jackson's eloquence, before or after
Nuremberg. Remember that first and foremost, Jackson was an advocate. His
judicial opinions tend to be neither measured assessments of competing
positions nor authoritative pronouncements. They are rhetorical exercises,
relying on detailed narratives, or vivid imagery or paired contradictions, all
designed to arrest or move the reader. They are designed to convince readers,
not to create rules.
Id. at 113.
165. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).




170. The Court did note that the police methodology here was "too close to the rack
and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation." Id. at 172.
171. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,27-28 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see also supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf).
172- Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173-74.
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had a self-evident association with totalitarianism. But the reference
undoubtedly was understated. Because the Court was largely in
agreement in Rochin, there was no need to wheel out, metaphorically
speaking, the big guns.
Of course judges are rhetoricians. How could they fail to be?
Not only do they for the most part come from the ranks of
advocates, 173 they become advocates for the decisions they have made
and must defend. 4 True, these expressions may reflect the rhetoric
of politics more than traditional dispassionate legal rhetoric. 75 But
to say that these comparisons are "rhetoric" is to fail to address the
underlying question: Why are they persuasive? The mere fact that
arguments are impassioned or compelling tells us nothing about the
source of their persuasive force, or why they were relevant to the
opinions they enhanced. 76
Moreover, if the sole objective were to taint a particular position
with negative associations, it would be hard to explain the selectivity
with which the comparisons are used. Far from being
indiscriminately scattered through any case in which there was a
disgruntled loser, the comparisons are used in those areas-coerced
confessions, home searches, electronic surveillance-that most
closely recalled totalitarian abuses.
B. The Significance of Totalitarian Comparisons
1. Totalitarian Comparisons as Negative Models
Part III.A discusses some plausible explanations for the use of
173. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1545, 1561 (1990).
174. See id. Gerald Wetlaufer notes:
Like the lawyer-advocate, the judge has a number of audiences she must
persuade that she is right and that the losing party's lawyer is wrong. These
audiences include the appellate courts, the legal community, the losing party
(who the judge hopes will leave the courtroom quietly and decide not to appeal
the case), and the public at large. At this point, the judge has a series of client-
like commitments-to her own decision, to her reputation for getting matters
right, to the winning party, and to the reputation of the courts and the rule of
law. The reputation of the courts and the rule of law, of course, will be sustained
or enhanced by decisions that are perceived as fair, right, and legitimate-and
diminished by those that are not.
Id. (footnote omitted).
175. See id. at 1562-63.
176. If opinions are viewed as "evidence that rational procedures were used to reach a
decision," MARC A. FRANKLIN, THE DYNAMICs OF AMERICAN LAW 266 (1968), the idea
that language in the opinions should be viewed primarily as emotional hyperbole rather
than proof of logical reasoning seems unsatisfying.
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totalitarian comparisons. No one explanation is likely to have been
operative in every circumstance, and these reasons may explain some
uses of the comparisons. The comparisons, however, played a larger
role in identifying and shaping the content of American
constitutional principles by negative example. Judges shaped their
positive view of what intrusions the Constitution permitted the
government in the criminal procedure area in part by considering the
negative examples of totalitarianism.77 This was not simply an
instance in which judges, bereft of true standards, imposed their own
will as a matter of constitutional fiat. 78 There were standards to
apply, though they required recognition of the principle that positive
rules can be derived by reference to negative information.1 79
The conclusion that particular examples are negative is itself
subjective. That conclusion in the postwar era was founded on a
broadly based social consensus about the evils of totalitarian models
and their fundamental inconsistency with the American system.
Faced with models that presented starkly the extents to which
American police authority could not be permitted to go and, perhaps,
177. See J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in J.L. AUSTIN: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
175, 177-80 (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 3d ed. 1979). Professor Austin
approaches the study of excuses by positing that studying excuses helps define conduct
"as so often, the abnormal will throw light on the normal." Id. at 179-80. Thus freedom
of action actually means only the absence of circumstances which preclude freedom of
action: "'[F]ree' is only used to rule out the suggestion of some or all of its recognized
antitheses.... In examining all the ways in which each action may not be 'free' ... we
may hope to dispose of the problem of Freedom." Id.
178. Nor was it an example of "perfect constitutionalism." See Mark A. Graber, Our
(Im)Perfect Constitution, 51 REV. POL. 86, 98 (1989) ("[P]erfect constitutionalists claim
that the Constitution must reflect their notion of the best possible human society .... -);
Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 358 (1981)
(arguing that perfect constitutionalists hold the view that, "properly construed, the
constitution guarantees against the political order most equality and autonomy values
which the commentators think a twentieth century Western liberal democratic
government ought to guarantee to its citizens" (emphasis omitted)).
179. The model that explains this best is a children's game, the object of which is to
determine which of a number of cards with pictured characters on them the other child
has chosen. In order to guess the identity of the other child's card, each player asks a
series of yes-or-no questions which narrow down the possible categories of the chosen
picture. A question like, "Does your character have glasses?" or "Does he have curly
hair?" provides information as to the true identity of the chosen card. The point is that
negative information is often as meaningful as positive information in deriving the
positive, descriptive characteristics needed to win the game.
Broader claims have been made for the role of negative difference in the area of
literary theory in, for example, the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, who argued that
language is based on differences and that the content of any term is determined by the
words that stand in opposition to it. See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General
Linguistics, in MODERN LITERARY THEORY: A READER 6, 8 (Philip Rice & Patricia
Waugh eds., 3d ed. 1996).
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a messianic view of the need for America to take the lead in
demonstrating the power of good government,'80 judges used the
comparisons to set forth the protections essential, in their view, to the
free and fair American system of justice.' Opinions challenging the
denial of such protections charged angrily that allowing such
activities on the part of government would open the door to
comparable abuses here.
This approach-deriving the content of constitutional principles
by reference to negative example-is entirely consistent with the
derivation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, both of which were
framed in reactive terms."8 Not based on some abstract series of
criteria or a theoretical construct of the optimal society, these
amendments were, like many constitutional, legislative, or regulatory
provisions, responsive to then-recent historical events, and were
designed to ensure that the types of invasions and indignities that
concerned the Framers did not happen again. The Framers knew
about certain, particularized circumstances of abuse of government
authority. Those abuses defined "tyranny" for them, not because
they represented the only ways that government could abuse its
power, but simply because those were the examples with which they
were familiar. Totalitarian comparisons reflected a redefinition of
"tyranny" in light of current perceptions.
Suppose a person dines in a restaurant with terrible service. The
waiter ignores him, spills hot soup in his lap, and brings him the
wrong order. If the patron is shortly thereafter in a position to
prepare a formal declaration of rules for waitpersons, he could
proceed in two ways. One would be to start from first principles,
which would require him to devise an aspirational code of ideal
180. See CAUTE, supra note 74, at 21-22. Caute explains:
By 1945 America's patriotic imperative had acquired a truly imperialistic and
even messianic image of its own mission in the world. This kind of imperialism,
particularly rooted in the liberal intelligentsia, is not essentially economic, but
rather cultural, idealistic, self-righteous, moral.... As Professor Robert E.
Cushman (a strong civil libertarian, incidentally) put it in 1948: "It has been
given to us, as the world's greatest democracy, a post of leadership in the all-
important task of establishing our doctrines of civil liberty throughout the world
as working principles by which the lives of free nations are to be governed."
Id. (quoting Prof. Robert E. Cushman).
181. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 209 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part)
("Modern totalitarianisms have been a stark reminder, but did not newly teach, that the
kicked-in door is the symbol of a rule of fear and violence fatal to institutions founded on
respect for the integrity of man."), overruled by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978).
182. See infra notes 184-210 and accompanying text.
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behavior for service personnel, one which might begin, perhaps,
"Good service is characterized at all times by concern for the
customer, a high degree of skill, and, of course, common courtesy."
The other way to approach this situation would be to compile a list of
"don'ts" directly responsive to his negative experiences. Such a list
might say, "Do not spill food on a customer. Do not ignore a
customer. Do not serve customers food they did not order." In these
circumstances, the neglected patron would be very likely to draft the
second kind of code of conduct rather than the first. But it is not
necessary to accept that this will always be the case to recognize that
it was what the Framers did when drafting the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.' 3
a. The Fourth Amendment
The historical origins of the Fourth Amendment are
noncontroversial. Most scholars attribute the Amendment to a
particular sequence of cases:1' 4 the English cases of Wilkes v. Wood'85
183. The Fourteenth Amendment coerced confession cases can be viewed somewhat
differently. Because the standard the courts were applying there, which defined those
rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-95 (1969), required
development and application of standards of fairness, see id. at 325-26, the
appropriateness of considering contemporary experiences and understandings that would
shape the changing concept of "ordered liberty" was manifest. Due process was by
definition an evolving concept. Notwithstanding the protestations that the concept of due
process was determinate and not "arbitrary or casual," id. at 326, the concept was
evanescent and inevitably changed over time, see, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27
(1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The Wolf Court, for
example, stated:
Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow
requirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights which the
courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society. But basic rights
do not become petrified as of any one time .... It is of the very nature of a free
society to advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right.
Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not confined within a
permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed the limits or the
essentials of fundamental rights.
Id. at 27. Justice Walter V. Schaefer wrote that "due process speaks for the future as well
as the present, and at any given time includes those procedures that are fair and feasible
in the light of then existing values and capabilities." Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and
State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1956). Thus, he noted that "the due
process clause ... is the statement of an ideal for the future rather than a blueprint of the
past." Id. It was, of course, precisely this uncertainty and the resultant potential for
inconsistent and subjective application that subjected the doctrine to extensive critique.
See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,175-77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
184. For some of the classic expositions of this argument, see JACOB W. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 27-40 (1966), NELSON B. LASSON,
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 22-50 (photo. reprint
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and Entick v. Carrington86 and the Writs of Assistance Case in
Massachusetts." Scholars disagree about the relative importance of
these cases, ss but this point is not critical to the analysis here.
It is, however, important to understand that the Amendment was
responsive to these recent events. Wilkes v. Wood was a suit brought
in 1762 by a member of the English parliament who had been
subjected to an extensive search of his home pursuant to a general
warrant to seize seditious material.189 His victory in the resulting civil
suit brought against the undersecretary who had supervised the
warrant's execution and the opinion of Chief Justice Pratt affirming
the freedom of English subjects from the oppression of such
searches' 90 were widely known and broadly acclaimed.'9' Entick v.
Carrington was a suit brought by John Entick, an author, when
papers belonging to him were seized pursuant to a general warrant in
1762.192 Chief Judge Pratt, who had by then become Lord Camden,
delivered the opinion for the Court of Common Pleas in 1765 holding
that there was no statutory authority for the issuance of such
warrants.193
1986) (1937), TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIEs IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
19 (1969), Amar, supra note 139, at 772, Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and
Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362-66 (1921), and Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible
Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257, 282-89 (1984). For a brief
summary of the history, see Stuntz, supra note 51, at 396-411.
185. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763); see also LASSON, supra note 184, at 43-47
(discussing Wilkes).
186. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1675).
187. For a discussion of this case, see generally M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF
ASSISTANCE CASE (1978). While the decision in the case was unreported, notes of the
hearings were kept by John Adams and Josiah Quincy and are reproduced as appendices
I and K. See id. apps. I, K.
188. There is some dispute about the relative significance of the Writs of Assistance
Case. Professor Amar argues that it was Wilkes v. Wood "whose lessons the Fourth
Amendment was undeniably designed to embody," and that the "1761 Boston writs of
assistance controversy ... went almost unnoticed in the debates over the federal
Constitution and Bill of Rights," Amar, supra note 139 at 772, while Professor Maclin
contends that warrantless searches conducted pursuant to the writs of assistance were
significant governmental intrusions that angered "the people," writ large, and were
significant in developing the fundamental meaning of the Amendment, see Tracey Maclin,
The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 218
(1993).
189. See Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489-90.
190. See id. at 498-99.
191. Professor Lasson notes: "'Wilkes and Liberty' became the byword of the times,
even in far-away America." LASSON, supra note 184, at 45-46.
192. See Entick v. Carrington, 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 807 (K.B. 1675).
193. See icL; LASSON, supra note 184, at 47-48.
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The Writs of Assistance Case arose in Massachusetts in 1761.194
The writs of assistance authorized customs officers to search any
place where they suspected uncustomed goods might be.'95 The writs
expired six months after the death of the sovereign, so when George
II died in 1760,196 a group of Boston merchants petitioned the court
for a hearing on the subject of granting new writs. 97 Although the
new writs were ultimately granted,198 the birth of the revolutionary
spirit was attributed to James Otis's speech challenging them in 1761.
John Adams would later write:
"Mr Otis's oration against the Writs of Assistance breathed
into this nation the breath of life. Every man of a crowded
audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take
arms against Writs of Assistance. Then and there was the
first scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great
Britain. Then and there the child Independence was
born.'
199
While this characterization-written decades after the event-may
be revisionist history, it is fairly contemporary revisionism and
suggests that these events were significant to at least one of the
Framers.
The Framers focused on these examples and the recent types of
abuse of governmental authority with which they-and the larger
public-were intimately familiar.200  To the Framers, these events
194. See LASSON, supra note 184, at 57.
195. See SMrrIH, supra note 187, at 531-32 (reprinting writs of assistance).
196. See id. at 130.
197. See LASSON, supra note 184, at 57-58. Smith notes that the occasion for the
hearing was an application by James Cockle, the Salem collector of customs, for a writ of
assistance, an application that predated the death of the King but decision on which was
postponed until afterward. See SMrrH, supra note 187, at 134-36, 142, 223-25.
198. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 184, at 35; SMITH, supra note 187, at 412.
199. LASSON, supra note 184, at 59 (quoting JOHN ADAMS, 10 WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 247-48,276 (1856) with minor punctuation and word changes).
200. At least this is the scholarly and judicial interpretation given these events. See
Stuntz, supra note 51, at 397 (stating that the Writs of Assistance Case, Entick v.
Carrington, and Wilkes v. Wood "were not only well known to the men who wrote and
ratified the Bill of Rights, but famous throughout the colonial population"); see also
Amar, supra note 139, at 772 ("[T]he facts of the 1763 case, Wilkes v. Wood, [its] plot and
cast of characters were familiar to every schoolboy in America .... Wilkes ... was the
paradigm search and seizure case for Americans. Indeed, it was probably the most
famous case in late eighteenth-century America, period." (footnotes omitted)). The
Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), agreed:
As every American statesmen [sic], during our revolutionary and formative
period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English
freedom [Entick], and considered it as the true and ultimate expression of
constitutional law, it may be confidently asserted that its propositions were in
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were as recent as Watergate is to present-day Americans and
probably remained in their consciousness longer, in a world of
delayed information. The Fourth Amendment was their response to
their understanding of "tyranny." It was framed in reactive mode, a
response to the abuses they themselves understood and perceived as
the most likely dangers posed by a government unrestrained.
b. The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment presents a more complex case than the
Fourth Amendment. First, the origins of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination are considerably more
controversial. The classic argument that the Amendment simply
memorialized a privilege already well-recognized in English criminal
procedure in the mid-seventeenth century201 has been contested hotly
by recent scholars who claim different provenance for the privilege.2°
the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and
were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Id. at 626; see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 317 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("These words [the statements of John Wilkes] and the complaints against
which they were directed were well known on this side of the water."). Professor Amar
suggests that the prevalence of cities named after Lord Camden stems from recognition of
Camden's role in these cases. See Amar, supra note 139, at 772 n.54.
201. See LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 313-21 (2d ed. 1986); see also John H. Wigmore, The
Privilege Against Self-Crimination; Its History, 15 HARv. L. REV. 610, 633 (1902).
Wigmore notes that the abolition of the ex officio oath in ecclesiastical courts was
"immediately communicated, naturally enough, to the common law courts." Wigmore,
supra, at 633. In those courts, "[ilt [was] ... claimed, flatly, that no man is bound to
incriminate himself, on any charge." Id. "[T]his claim [came] to be conceded by the
judges," until "there [was] no longer any doubt" of the existence of the privilege. Id.; see
also id. at 633-34 n.7 (citing cases decided from 1660 to 1700 and noting that "by 1688...
the courts had for a decade ceased to question" the privilege). The Levy volume has been
termed "the most influential account of the origins of the privilege," R.H. Helmholz,
Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European Ins
Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 963 (1990), though it has been rebuffed by the
contemporary scholarship, see, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law
Criminal Procedure: The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in R.H. HELMHOLZ ET
AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
82, 91-92, 100-01 (1997); M.R.T. MacNair, The Early Development of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STuD. 66, 68-69 (1990); Eben Moglen,
The Privilege in British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth Amendment, in
HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra, at 109, 120, 138-39.
202. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1068 (1994). Professor Langbein
argues that the modem privilege could not have existed without defense counsel, which
was prohibited in all English criminal cases until 1696 and "remained a relative trickle"
until the 1780s. Id. As long as defendants were required to conduct their own defenses-
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For our purposes, it is not necessary to resolve this debate.
Whether the privilege meant the protection of the individual against
being compelled to make statements for later use at trial, or whether
it meant a much narrower protection against being compelled to
respond to questioning under oath, and when the privilege became
commonplace, are not critical to the point here: that the perceived
need for the privilege had its origins in relatively recent history,
though not as recent as the Fourth Amendment's. 03  The
Amendment looked backward, to the use of the "oath ex officio" by
English ecclesiastical courts in the seventeenth century to compel
sworn testimony from defendants accused of religious offenses2°4 and
to the tortures of the Star Chamber 5 Like the Fourth Amendment,
the Fifth Amendment was directed at government oppression of
citizens. 6 It was designed to prevent the tyrannical outcomes of
the model Langbein denominates the "accused speaks" trial-defendants simply could
not remain silent and simultaneously defend themselves. Id. at 1054; see also Langbein,
supra note 201, at 82, 96-97 (arguing that the privilege "is an artifact of the adversary
system of criminal procedure," which did not develop until the 1780s); MacNair, supra
note 201, at 69-70, 84 (arguing that the common-law right postdates the Revolution of
1688). Professor Helmholz argues that the source of the privilege is the continental law of
ius commune and that "focusing, as Levy does, exclusively on the opinions of the
seventeenth-century common law judges and reading them against the backdrop of
subsequent developments has resulted in a narrow and misleading account of the origin of
the privilege." Helmholz, supra note 201, at 964. The development of the scholarly
record is well outlined in Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1086, 1087-88
(1994). The Helmholz volume compiles these articles and other recent scholarship on the
origins of the privilege. For an intriguing attempt to reconcile these contrasting views of
the privilege based on the argument that assertions of procedural unfairness really
couched objections to the substantive offenses charged, see Stuntz, supra note 51, at 411-
19.
203. Wigmore commented on this:
It is a little singular that the [Framers], who had themselves suffered nothing in
this respect, and could herein aim merely to copy the lessons which their
forefathers of a century ago had handed down as taught by their own experience,
should have incorporated a principle which those forefathers themselves, fresh
from that experience, had never thought to register among the fundamentals of
just procedure.
Wigmore, supra note 201, at 636.
204. The oath ex officio is discussed in Helmholz, supra note 201, at 965-67. Being
compelled to speak under oath-which required a guilty party to confess or, literally, be
damned-may have been perceived as particularly oppressive in an era when many
believed violation of the oath to have serious consequences for their immortal souls. See
Stuntz, supra note 51, at 412 (noting that the complaint that the oath ex officio was
torture for the conscience had some significance, "especially in a time when people took
oaths and swearing a good deal more seriously than they might today").
205. See LEvY, supra note 201, at 372 (citing a treatise available in prerevolutionary
New York referring to the Star Chamber).
206. See id. at 430-31. Levy noted:
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those procedures known to the Framers. The privilege was, again,
reactively drawn,207 in fear of what known abuses might be imposed °"
in its absence. 9
Thus the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were each shaped in
reliance on particular examples of tyranny, generally understood and
uniformly rejected by those who drafted the amendments.210 Almost
by definition, then, the Amendments set out prescriptive rules based
on historical models of practices that the Framers wanted to
preclude. The guarantees were defined in positive terms but
conceived of almost entirely in negative ones.
Not only is this approach consistent with the history of the
amendments, the notion that the content of positive constitutional
guarantees may be derived partly by relying on negative models is
not unique. In other areas, looking to comparative context has
provided a basis for constitutional interpretation. Consider the
Eighth Amendment's proportionality jurisprudence, for example, as
set out for the first time in Weems v. United States.2 '
By stating the principle [of the privilege against self-incrimination] in the
Bill of Rights, which was also a bill of restraints upon government, they were
once again sounding the tocsin against the dangers of government oppression of
the individual ....
... The framers understood that without fair and regularized procedures
to protect the criminally accused, there could be no liberty. They knew that
from time immemorial, the tyrant's first step was to use the criminal law to crush
his opposition.... The Fifth Amendment was part and parcel of the procedures
that were so crucial, in the minds of the framers, to the survival of the most
treasured rights.
Id.
207. See Moglen, supra note 202, at 1121 ("Compulsory self-incrimination was what
happened in Star Chamber or in France .... "). Professor Moglen notes statements from
the anti-Federalists in Massachusetts and New York warning that "Congress might
institute 'the Inquisition'" or the Star Chamber. Id. at 1122 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Moglen deems these examples of "Richard Hofstadter's 'Paranoid Style'
(Protestant variant)." Id.
208. See id. at 1120-21. Professor Moglen notes: "Among the elements of that
fundamental law history was a belief in nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, for if a future
legislature or tyrannical executive could impose ex officio oaths or judicial torture then
the constitutional function of jury trial ... could not be preserved." Id.
209. It was thus "expected to inhibit future tyrannical innovations." Id. at 1124.
210. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 188, at 201 ("[T]he central meaning of the Fourth
Amendment is distrust of police power and discretion.").
211. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Actually, the Weems Court was applying not the Eighth
Amendment but a provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights identical to the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 383 (White, J.,
dissenting). Weems has been consistently viewed as an Eighth Amendment decision. See
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 n.4 (1988); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
300 (1987). Weems continues to be a significant precedent in the proportionality area.
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Weems was a harbormaster in the Philippines employed by the
"'United States Government of the Philippine Islands.' "212
Convicted of making two false entries on a public document,21 3 he
was sentenced, under the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands, to
fifteen years of "cadena temporal," a punishment that included hard
labor in chains214 as well as the perpetual loss of certain civil
liberties.215 The Supreme Court of the Philippines affirmed Weems's
sentence, so he sought review in the United States Supreme Court.
There, for the first time, Weems contended that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Philippine Bill of
Rights,216 the language of which was identical to that of the Eighth
Amendment.2 7 Weems's counsel was quick to inform the Court that
Weems, a native-born American, would be subjected to this alien and
bizarre punishment unless the court found it constitutionally
impermissible.2 5 The court agreed.219
See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Weems in support of argument against expanding the scope of the Eighth Amendment);
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 287 (1983) (describing Weems as "leading case"), overruled
by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion).
212. Weems, 217 U.S. at 357 (quoting prosecution's complaint).
213. See id. at 357-58.
214. See id. at 358, 364.
215. See id. at 364-65 (describing accessory penalties of civil interdiction, perpetual
absolute disqualification, and subjection to surveillance for life, which attached to persons
sentenced to cadena temporal).
216. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 5, 14-15, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910) (No. 20).
217. The Eighth Amendment provides that "cruel and unusual punishments [shall not
be] inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
218. See Supp. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 13-14, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910) (No. 20). The defendant's brief was directed squarely at eliciting this nativist
sentiment, making clear that Weems, a native-born American, would be subjected to the
excessive punishments of Philippine justice. See id. The brief noted that, unless the Court
acted, "this plaintiff in error for the offense of taking credit in his record for a little over
two hundred dollars more than he had actually paid," would pay a large fine, suffer
lengthy imprisonment and subsequent disabilities and that "[h]e cannot even come back
to the United States, where he was born and reared, unless some now unknown and
undesignated official chooses to give him that liberty." Id.
219. See Weems, 277 U.S. at 377. The Court's primary objection to the punishment
was that its severity was inexplicable and its source alien and bizarre: "[T]he sentence in
this case, excite[s] wonder in minds accustomed to a more considerate adaptation of
punishment to the degree of crime." Id. at 365. The law, the Court said, had "no fellow
in American legislation," came from "a government of a different form and genius from
ours," and was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and
follows imprisonment." Id. at 377. Noting that the Philippine Commission legislation
imposed a punishment of not more than 15 years for counterfeiting or forging government
obligations, which the Court viewed as a substantially more serious offense, the Court
overturned the punishment. See id. at 380-81.
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It is hard to find any textual basis for the decision. Indeed, to
facilitate its result, the Court itself had to devise the principle, often
quoted since, that constitutional text must adapt to changing
circumstances: "Time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."22
The punishment, while severe, was not particularly shocking in light
of the ready availability of severe state sentences.221 Weems reflects
the Court's reading the term "cruel and unusual punishment" in
negative reaction to the circumstances presented by what was to
them an unacceptable example of excessive punishment. The
Justices were not sure what "cruel and unusual" meant, exactly, but
they knew it when they saw it.
Weems is not a perfect metaphor. The Court did not look
outside the four corners of the case for the negative models that gave
content to the constitutional provision. The "negative model" the
Court considered was not some hypothetical comparison, but
Weems's own treatment under Philippine law. Nonetheless, the case
demonstrates that the use of negative examples to give content to
constitutional guarantees is not unique to the postwar period.'m
Thus, the argument that totalitarian comparisons played a role in
the postwar development of constitutional criminal procedure by
serving as the negative example that defined positive values is
consistent with the history of the relevant amendments and practice
in other areas. The question that might still be asked is whether
consideration of other, contemporary objects of comparison is
legitimate. The constitutional criminal procedure guarantees were
derived in reaction to a specific set of "formative events," and it
could be argued that the privilege of determining the appropriate
objects for comparison belonged to the Framers alone. Indeed, the
220. Id. at 373; see also id at 378 ("The clause of the Constitution ... may be therefore
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.").
221. The Court in Weems mentioned a number of grievous state punishments which
state courts had sustained: whipping as a punishment for wife beating, see id. at 378
(citing Foote v. State, 59 Md. 264 (1882)), 39 lashes and being sold into slavery as a
punishment of a person of color for grand larceny, see id. (citing Aldridge v.
Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 447 (1824)), and the death penalty for a person "who should
make an assault upon any railroad train ... for the purpose and with the intent to commit
murder, robbery, or other felony upon a passenger or [employee]," id. at 379 (quoting
Territory v. Ketchum, 10 N.M. 718 (1901)).
222. The author's views about the appropriateness of this conclusion are not essential
to the point here: that in other areas the content of constitutional values has been derived
in reaction to negative example.
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courts have referred freely to the original formative events, using
them to argue that particular types of police conduct should be
considered in light of the oppressive circumstances the Framers had
in mind as they drafted the amendments.2 Did the courts have any
business invoking any events other than the "formative events" that
had been in the Framers' contemplation? Would an originalist
conception not properly require the courts to focus more single-
mindedly on the historical antecedents of the amendments z24 and
223. For a discussion of cases invoking the origins of the Fourth Amendment, see
supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. Discussing the origin of the Fifth Amendment
in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), the Supreme Court noted:
The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare [no one held under sway to
incriminate himself] had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and
manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long
obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from
the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the
protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, was not
uncommon even in England.
Id. at 596; see also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544-45 (1897) (quoting Brown).
In United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953), the Second Circuit considered
a case of perjury arising out of the defendant's denial, at a prior trial, that he had ever
been a member of the Communist Party. See id. at 568. The court affirmed the
conviction, see id. at 570-71, but Judge Hand objected, finding misconduct in the
government's handling of the case-primarily in the persistent and, to him, ultimately
coercive questioning of the defendant's wife before the grand jury, see id. at 571 (Hand,
J., dissenting). He wrote:
The privilege against self-incrimination itself arose because of the abuses of the
"ex officio examination" in the 17th century in the Star Chamber and the
Ecclesiastical Commission, where there was no judge, and which was in camera
after the model of the Holy Office itself. Save for torture, it would be hard to
find a more effective tool of tyranny than the power of unlimited and unchecked
ex parte examination.... [T]he Supreme Court has shown itself extremely
sensitive to the opportunities for oppression that such examination offers; and
the present time is hardly a propitious season to abate that vigilance.
Id. at 573 (Hand, J., dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted). While relying on
seventeenth-century history, the reference to the McCarthy-era witch hunts is
unmistakable.
Implications to the contrary were vigorously rejected. Rejecting an argument that
the privilege against self-incrimination was not based on the Framers' experience, Dean
Griswold asked, "Was there no Writs of Assistance case? Were there no courts of
admiralty? Were not [John] Lilburne and [William] Bradford and many others, and the
Star Chamber, a vivid part of the tradition and thus of the experience of the founding
fathers?" Griswold, supra note 83, at 20. He concluded, "to say that these events were
not known to and did not play an important part in the experience of the founding fathers
is a clear misconception of history." Id. at 22.
224. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 856-87
(1989) (arguing that constitutional interpretation "requires immersing oneself in the
political and intellectual atmosphere of the time [of the Framers]-somehow placing out
of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs,
attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day"); see also
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication, 82
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reject the use of totalitarian comparisons as irrelevant?
Current originalist scholarship increasingly acknowledges the
appropriateness of moving beyond the strict literal application of text
to account for changing circumstances.m Even from the originalist
perspective, then, there is some consensus that the interpretation of
open-ended constitutional language may sometimes reflect the
circumstances of a changed society, 6 and some argue that the stricter
view of originalism is on the wane.17
Moreover, the task it suggests is daunting, if not impossible. The
historically accurate reading it requires, which demands that "[w]ords
be read with the gloss of the experience of those who framed them,"
and that those words "receive the significance of the experience to
which they were addressed-a significance not to be found in the
dictionary," is certainly a challenge. To understand the experience
NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230 (1988) (arguing that originalism "calls for judges to apply the
rules of the written constitution in the sense in which those rules were understood by the
people who enacted them"). Professor Lawrence Lessig has deemed this "one-step"
originalism. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Thx. L. REv. 1165, 1183-85
(1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity in Translation].
225. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A
Comment on Professor Lessig's Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1448
(1997) ("[A]ll originalists agree that application of the text to changing circumstances in
many of the circumstances [Lessig] describes is quite unremarkable."); Michael W.
McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1269, 1284 (1997)
("[N]o reputable originalist ... takes the view that the Framers' 'assumptions and
expectation about the correct application' of their principles is controlling....
Mainstream originalists recognize that the Framers' analysis of particular applications
could be wrong, or that circumstances could have changed and made them wrong."); see
also Colloquy, Fidelity as Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1507, 1511 (1997)
(suggesting that "sophisticated originalism" requires adherence to specific texts but that
open-ended constitutional language creates "the potential for growth and accommodation
of change in the meaning of the word over time"). Professor Calabresi attributes this
view to the citizenry as well: "The American people understand that constitutional
commitments do grow over time and that there is open-ended language in the text that
may sometimes take on new meanings in modem contexts." Calabresi, supra, at 1454-55;
see also Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional
Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 681-86 (1991) (discussing the concept of "sophisticated
originalism").
226. Or, these may be simply what Justice Scalia calls "fainthearted" originalists.
Scalia, supra note 224, at 864.
227. See Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv.
1627, 1627 (1997) (arguing that the "strong version of originalism," which holds that
"contemporary constitutional problems must be resolved by strict adherence to the intent
of the Constitution's Framers or the understanding of its Ratifiers," is "hardly reputable
today," and receives the attention it does because of its "provocative conclusions and the
fact that law journals are run by students").
228. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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of the Framers is one thing. To appreciate the vividness and
significance of that experience in a visceral sense is quite another.
Indeed, to appreciate it fully suggests the need for a vehicle to apply
constitutional principles to contemporary situations. One approach
is Professor Lessig's "translation" analogy,1 9 which suggests that, by
relying on totalitarian comparisons, the courts were striving for
constitutional fidelity by translating the guarantees of constitutional
criminal procedure to take account of the changed circumstances of
police power and governmental authority they facedl °
2. The Translation Analogy
Professor Lessig has argued that the process of "interpreting"
the Constitution might more appropriately be viewed as a process of
"translation."2'3 Our goal as modem constitutional readers, he
contends, is not simply to determine how the Framers 2 would have
applied a particular constitutional provision and then to enforce that
determination. Such an approach, Lessig argues, actually might fail
to preserve the original meaning of the underlying constitutional
provision, because of changes in the context in which those provisions
are understood. 3 True fidelity to the constitutional document, he
contends, may require more than the literal enforcement of its terms
as originally understood. A constitutional interpreter may, instead,
need to identify the values underlying the constitutional provision,
and then apply those values to the changed context to determine the
229. The author is indebted for the translation analysis to the work of Professor
Lessig. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 224; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and
Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1365 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity and
Constraint]. For additional discussion of translation analysis, see Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 218 (1980)
(noting that constitutional interpreters "must often 'translate' the adopters' concepts and
intentions into our time and apply them to situations that the adopters did not foresee").
230. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 224, at 1165-66, 1171-73.
231. See, e.g., id. at 1171-73 (noting that "there can be fidelity in interpretation even if
there is a change in a text's readings").
232. The Framers are not the only group whose perspective could be relevant to an
originalist approach; the Ratifiers' thoughts might be useful as well. See, e.g., Michael C.
Dorf, A Comment on Text, Time and Audience Understanding in Constitutional Law, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 983, 984 (1995) (advocating that the Ratifiers' understanding should be
relied upon instead of the conflicting intent of the Framers); Kay, supra note 224, at 247
(suggesting that the ratifying majority is the proper group from which to discern original
intent). But see Monaghan, supra note 178, at 375 n.130 ("Although the intention of the
ratifiers, not the Framers, is in principle decisive, the difficulties of ascertaining the intent
of the ratifiers leaves little choice but to accept the intent of the Framers as a fair
reflection of it.").
233. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 224, at 1176.
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effect that change of context may have had on the meaning of the
constitutional text.' This process of applying identified values to a
contemporary context is what Professor Lessig calls "translation,"
which, he argues, has an "extremely strong claim to constitutional
fidelity."215
The translation model is only one of many theories of how
constitutional interpretation can accommodate changed
circumstances' 6 It is also a highly malleable interpretive instrument.
Constitutional "values" can be defined broadly or narrowly;137 the
234. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869,
872-73 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig, Cyberspace]; see also Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,
supra note 224, at 1177 ("If context matters to meaning, and if contexts may change, then
the reader focused on fidelity needs a way to neutralize or accommodate the effect that
changing context may have on meaning. Fidelity, that is, needs a way of reading that
preserves meaning despite changes in context.").
235. Lessig, Cyberspace, supra note 234, at 873. Professor Lessig offers as an example
Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Lessig, Cyberspace, supra note 234, at 872-73
(noting that Justice Brandeis expanded the original scope of a Fourth Amendment
violation to include technological advances such as wiretapping).
236. Ronald Dworkin's theory of integrity, for example, might model the use of
totalitarian comparison as effectively as the translation theory. Integrity in law, in
Dworkin's view, requires decisionmakers to "assume, so far as this is possible, that law is
structured by a coherent set of principles about justice and fairness and procedural due
process" and to decide cases that come before them by deriving and applying those
underlying principles. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 243 (1986) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE]. This is particularly the case, Dworkin argues, with regard to
individual rights as against the government. See id. at 368; see also RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147 (1977) (arguing that interpretation of the Bill of Rights
"must be understood as appealing to moral concepts rather than laying down particular
conceptions; therefore a court that undertakes the burden of applying these clauses fully
as law must be ... prepared to frame and answer questions of political morality"). The
ultimate goal, in Dworkin's view, is to articulate "an overall story worth telling now, a
story with a complex claim: that present practice can be organized by and justified in
principles sufficiently attractive to provide an honorable future." DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE, supra, at 227-28.
This provides another way to understand totalitarian comparisons. Decisionmakers
deriving the underlying principles from the text and prior interpretation of the criminal
procedure amendments surely would have incorporated ideas of "justice and fairness," or
"political morality," which developed in light of their exposure to European
totalitarianism. The incorporation of the comparisons in the opinions simply
demonstrates the centrality of those experiences to their vision of what rights an
individual accused of a crime ought to have to be protected from the reach of an angry
government.
The phenomenon of totalitarian comparison might fit effectively into a number of
theories of constitutional interpretation. There are too many to catalog systematically
here; but the utility of the phenomenon as a concrete example of the application of theory
suggests its significance.
237. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 150 (1990) (arguing that
Justice Brandeis's approach in Olmstead was that interpretation of the Constitution
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resulting range of potentially faithful "translations" is accordingly
broad."8 The model therefore lacks much in the way of predictive
power; interpreters with an expansive view of a particular
constitutional guarantee will define the underlying "values" broadly,
enabling an expansive translation. It would be difficult to describe
any of a wide range of plausible results as more faithful to the
Constitution than any other.
As a descriptive model, however, the translation concept has real
value in helping us understand the uses of totalitarian comparison.239
The criminal procedure amendments can be seen narrowly, as
tailored responses to particular grievances, or, more broadly, as
bulwarks against governmental tyranny. This underlying value had
then to be considered in light of the modern context. That context, in
the postwar period, included the understanding of totalitarianism,
which reflected a profound shift in the concept of what tyranny was.
Not simply a way to target particular categories of opponents of the
regime, as the Framers might have seen it,240 the abuse of police
authority came to symbolize the abusive power of repressive regimes,
"police states," whose very existence threatened open and
should not be limited to an understanding of the specific "evils and mischiefs which gave
rise to the language in the first place ... but should be guided by an understanding of the
general evils, or goods, of which these are local examples").
238. The problem is endemic to constitutional interpretation. See Mark V. Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARV. L. REv. 781,790-91 (1983).
239. Some consider this very enterprise invalid. See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 411 (1997). Professor Klarman critiques at some length the
"translation enterprise," challenging in particular its application to the "criminal
procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights," which "were almost certainly designed with
the objective of protecting religious and political dissenters, rather than the sort of
criminals (murderers, rapists, robbers) they protect today." Id. (footnote omitted).
Relying on Professor Stuntz, he argues that "criminal procedure protections initially were
a mechanism for limiting the government's substantive regulatory agenda-a supplement
to the free speech and free exercise notions enshrined simultaneously in the First
Amendment," and asks plaintively, "[h]ow can one possibly translate concepts from such
a world into our own and make any pretense that we are deriving answers from the
Framers' intent rather than smuggling in our own?" Id. Professor Klarman has fallen
prey to his own critique, however; he has "selected an arbitrarily low level of generality at
which to translate." Id. at 398. While I appreciate Professor Stuntz's thesis and do not
quarrel with his conclusions either about the nature of the history that inspired the need
for the criminal procedure amendments or their immediate perceived effects, the intent
behind those amendments can still be conceived at several levels of generality. To argue
for the more general-the need to limit tyranny, which is the use of the awesome power
of the government to invade the very core of the individual-is to see the appropriateness
of translation. To argue the contrary would suggest the illegitimacy of the use of the
comparisons in the context in which they are discussed in this Article.




What changed circumstances required the guarantees of
constitutional criminal procedure to be addressed in light of their
contemporary context? The tools and capacities of abusive
government-and, with them, the nature of tyranny-had changed
irrevocably. Those activities that posed, to the Framers, the greatest
threat of government invasion and police abuse were those activities
possible and widely engaged in at the time: broad and
unparticularized searches, freely authorized, for seditious material
(the English precedents) or goods held in violation of customs laws
(the writs of assistance). By contrast, the postwar world had to
acknowledge the use of widespread electronic surveillance as a
routine tool of governmental control, the use of torture not only as a
means of securing confession, but also as a means of subduing and
intimidating the civilian population, and the use of police authority
directed at the control of thought and the manipulation of mass
psychology.241
Moreover, the threats to individual freedoms posed by
totalitarianism differed from the historical threats precisely because
of their perceived imminence to the postwar judges. Those threats
invoked a visceral and passionate response rather than a purely
intellectual one. In that sense, they resembled the Framers' view of
the criminal procedure amendments better than a dispassionate
retelling of warmed-over history.
This is not, of course, translation in its narrowest sense. The
courts were not confronted with a word or phrase of commonly
understood meaning that had come over the passage of time to
include other commonly understood members of its category,242 or a
situation in which technological innovation had placed within the
appropriate purview of the amendments something that simply did
not exist in the Framers' era.243 In those situations, the "translation"
metaphor is self-evident; it suggests a reinterpretation of narrow and
241. Professor Lessig would call this a problem of "forward" translation-reading the
text so that it has the same meaning in the present as the original text in its original
context, with an eye towards carrying the text forward to us, rather than carrying us back
to the world of the text. See Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, supra note 229, at 1371.
242. One example of this would be interpreting the terms "army" and "navy" to
include the Air Force, even though at the time of the Framers there was no such thing as
an air force. See id. at 1377.
243. For example, the Court has concluded that the Fourth Amendment applies to
telephone conversations, although they are not "persons, houses, papers or effects." See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, supra note
229, at 1378-79.
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precise language in light of changed circumstances.
But a more profound and more complex problem confronted
courts in the postwar era: they now understood the most imminent
and most frightening threats of abuse of governmental authority
differently than the constitutional drafters had perceived them. To
understand the constitutional criminal procedure guarantees
properly, they had to be viewed from the perspective of the mostimminent and frightening contemporary examples of police
overreaching.
Because the template from which the postwar jurists drew their
concept of police overreaching differed strikingly from the vision of
the original Framers and Ratifiers, they interpreted the constitutional
protections in fight of the threat posed by particular types of police
conduct they viewed as the most imminent and dangerous to them,
and therefore critical for constitutional redress? 44 These jurists
sought to apply the constitutional provision as the Framers had: in
the face of the most imminent threats they perceived to individual
dignity and personal autonomy.
Ironically, this may be consistent with "original intent" in more
ways than one. While the historical examples of tyranny may be
intellectually useful in understanding the Framers' intentions, they
are not compelling or meaningful to contemporary constitutional
interpreters.245 Even if they are familiar with the history underlying
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, they do not care about it very
much. The historical antecedents of the amendments lack immediacy
and pose no threat to a contemporary jurist. Any commitment they
engender is intellectual rather than passionate. Use of totalitarian
comparisons, by contrast, put the judiciary very much in the Framers'
positions. To understand the Framers' perspective on police
authority, it made sense to contextualize the dispute-to consider
threats posed by police power to individual liberty in the light of
those threats that seemed most immediate to them-and to interpret
the rule in light of that context. The recency of the cases upon which
the Fourth Amendment was based imbued it with a certain amount
of what can only be described as passion. The postwar judges sought
244. See Monaghan, supra note 178, at 363 (referring to "a set of provisions
characterized by the need for ongoing interpretation and application not to the views of
contemporary society, but to the contemporary manifestations of problems identified by
the Framers" (emphasis omitted)).
245. Everyone in the colonial era remembered them-or at least that is the
assumption on which contemporary Fourth Amendment scholars have operated. See
supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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to read the Amendment that way as well.246  The invocation of
totalitarian comparisons evidenced "the vulnerability of the liberties
[the Constitution] was designed to protect"247 in a way that musty
history could not.
IV. CONCLUSION
The impulse to compare is natural. Confronted with the
perennial conflict between the need for effective law enforcement
and the need for effective limits on police power, judges in the
postwar era considered that balance in light of what they perceived as
profound, imminent threats to individual autonomy and the social
order. Their opinions reflected these contemporary concerns by
making express reference to totalitarianism, contrasting American
constitutional values with the negative models that were most current
at the time they wrote. They viewed the issue of what our
Constitution permits the police to do as central to what kind of
society America would be, and treated the examples they included as
modern equivalents of those examples of tyranny the Framers
confronted. The incorporation of totalitarian comparisons reflects
this process of "translating" the constitutional criminal procedure
guarantees in light of their contemporary context. That these
comparisons were widely and routinely used without comment
suggests an unconscious acceptance of this contextual model of
constitutional interpretation. What made this possible was the
shared consensus about that context. Abhorrence of the police state
practices associated with Nazism and, later, Soviet totalitarianism
was generally shared and profoundly felt. Such widespread
consensus informed the context and enabled it to play a significant
role in constitutional adjudication.
Where does this leave us with regard to the question with which
we began? Is the current tendency to invoke Nazism in criticizing
abuses of police authority the outrage some would make it, or is it
part of a strong and lasting constitutional tradition? Neither is
246. Professor Lessig would call this "backward translation." Lessig, Fidelity and
Constraint, supra note 229, at 1375. "Forward translation carries meaning into this
context; backward translation lets us travel back to the meaning in an original context."
Id.
247. United States v. Alexander, 755 F. Supp. 448, 453 (D.D.C. 1991), affd, 961 F.2d
964 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see id. ("[T]he War on Drugs and the activities of the Metropolitan
Police Department dedicated drug interdiction officers make timely and relevant
reminders of the Eighteenth Century origins of the Fourth Amendment and of more
contemporary events which evidence the vulnerability of the liberties it is designed to
protect." (emphasis added)).
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correct. The development of contemporary totalitarianism
profoundly shaped American thought about the power of the police
and made this issue central to the question of the nature and
character of American society. That particular police practices, if
permitted, will open the door to totalitarianism remains a potent
argument. The argument is not, however, as potent as it used to be.
Symbols that are the subject of casual epithets or television humor
are unlikely to continue to reflect profound and deeply felt
commitments.
Have recent events provided an example of sufficient immediacy
and consensus that totalitarian comparison can figure meaningfully in
constitutional interpretation? None yet seems to have presented
itself, and indeed the reverse argument-that threats to the social
order present a context requiring a less, rather than more, restrictive
reading of the criminal procedure amendments-seems more
frequently articulated.24
Almost by definition, context is the product of a particular
moment. In the postwar period, the horror engendered by fascism's
potential offered a shared, immediate, and critically important
context for understanding and articulating the necessity of limits on
police authority. Fifty years later, totalitarian comparisons run the
risk of losing the weight and immediacy that characterized their
contemporaneous use. Today's users understand them but do not
feel their imminence and importance the way the postwar writers did.
Our comprehension of the totalitarian comparisons of the postwar
period, like our understanding of the eighteenth century, may be
248. "Terrorism" might be the next shared "context" on which background the
criminal procedure amendments are interpreted. Note recent suggestions by the
Secretary of Defense that "[tierrorism is escalating to the point that Americans soon may
have to choose between civil liberties and more intrusive means of protection." Patrick
Pexton, Terrorism Threatens Americans' Civil Liberties, Defense Chief Says,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 15, 1997, at C2 (paraphrasing Secretary of Defense William
Cohen); see also Robert Shogan, Civil Liberties, Paranoia Among Costs of Anti-Terrorism
War, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1997, at A5 (noting the increasing cost and lack of privacy "as
a result of... anti-terrorism measures"). The contention that terrorism poses a profound
threat to the democratic way of life suggests an obvious parallel with the rhetoric of anti-
totalitarianism. See Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the
Outlaw, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 119, 122-23, 143-44. Professor Porras's argument that
rhetoric is used to construct the concept of "terrorism" to define the terrorist as a
monstrous "other" requiring extraordinary means to suppress, supports this possibility.
See id. at 121. Professor Porras notes that "[t]he terrorist is transformed ... from an
ordinary deviant into a frightening, 'foreign,' barbaric beast at the same time that extra-
normal means are called for to fight terrorism" and that "[s]ince terrorists are never
imagined as anything other than terrifying, blood-thirsty barbarians, ordinary law is
understood to be deficient or insufficient to deal with them." Id.
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distant or even second-hand; the comparisons have become part of
the historical recitation of tyranny rather than its contemporary
context. They run the risk of becoming the "writs of assistance" of
the next century-events invoked to stand for a passionate insistence
in the individual's right to autonomy in the face of police authority,
which the speaker no longer recalls and can no longer express with
the fervor that characterizes a true believer. They run the risk of
joining a rote recitation, part of a list of distant outrages. They run
the risk of becoming mere words.

